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FOREWORD

Over summer, I had the privilege to appoint
six of Fordham Law’s standout professors
to faculty chairs. In September, the School
celebrated these six newly appointed
chairholders in a ceremony befitting their
prominent stature in academia and their
pedagogical excellence in the classroom.
The scholarly work of these six chairholders—James J. Brudney,
Nestor M. Davidson, Tanya K. Hernández, Clare Huntington, Ethan J.
Leib, and Richard Squire—displays a depth of rigor and understanding
that is urgently needed for today’s legal and judicial systems. Their
work bucks conventional wisdom in corporate law, labor law, family
law, property law, antidiscrimination law, contracts, and constitutional
law and theory. Their books and articles influence law-reform efforts
in the public sphere and shape the way we think about the law and
legal issues. Their bold ideas drive determined action.
Fordham Law is so fortunate to have these six and our 17 other
existing chairs as part of our outstanding faculty. Together they
form an intellectual storehouse without peer. They are the core
of the Law School. I hope you enjoy reading excerpts from some
of the scholarship that is shedding light on some of the most
complex issues facing the legal profession and society at large.

Matthew Diller
Dean and Paul Fuller Professor of Law

James J. Brudney
The Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law

An established leader in the field of labor law, Professor James
Brudney has recently engaged in scholarship that illuminates dynamic
relationships between international and national labor law and explores
ongoing tensions between higher and lower appellate courts when they
construe federal statutes.
Brudney came to Fordham Law from The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law, where he taught for almost two decades and received the
Alumni Award for Distinguished Teaching from the university in 2008.
Before entering academia, he served as chief counsel and staff director
for the United States Senate Subcommittee on Labor, practiced labor and
employment law with a Washington, D.C., law firm, and clerked for
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun. Brudney earned his B.A.
from Amherst College, his A.B. and M.A. from Oxford University, and his
J.D. from Yale Law School.
In “The Internationalization of Sources of Labor Law,” Brudney examines
how international labor law norms, specifically those promulgated by the
International Labor Organization, have contributed to the development
and implementation of national labor laws over the past 25 years. In
another article published in 2017, “Protean Statutory Interpretation in the
Courts of Appeals,” he analyzes, empirically and doctrinally, how circuit
court judges apply textualist and purposive interpretive resources—
notably dictionaries and legislative history—in ways that are more
pragmatic, and less dogmatic, than the applications used by their
Supreme Court counterparts.
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EXC E R P TS

The Internationalization of
Sources of Labor Law
39 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law
(forthcoming 2017)
Since the early 1990s, the rights and protections accorded to workers in their own
countries have been increasingly influenced by international labor norms. A major
reason for labor law’s more globalized focus has been the substantial expansion in
levels of international trade and investment. The growing attention paid to the relationship between international and domestic labor law has consequences for tens of
millions of workers and also for national governments, multinational corporations,
and international public bodies. This Article examines how international labor law
norms—specifically those promulgated by the International Labor Organization
(ILO)—have affected the development and implementation of national labor
legislation in the past 25 years.
The Article focuses on laws and practices in the Americas, although its descriptive
and normative observations have broader reach. It does not consider changes in
sources of law within the United States. Our country’s self-proclaimed exceptionalist stance regarding the impact of human rights law and norms has been asserted
regularly in Congress and also at the Supreme Court. This has precluded any serious
impact from transnational sources on U.S. domestic labor law. The United States,
however, has been a major player in leveraging the impact of free trade agreements
as sources of change for the labor laws of other countries.
The ILO Structure and ‘Soft Law’ Pressures
The ILO is a specialized agency within the United Nations system. Its mission is to
promote social justice by promulgating internationally recognized labor standards
in the form of Conventions. To that end, it also monitors implementation of these
standards and provides technical support and training to governments and employer and worker organizations seeking to conform their own laws and practices with
the standards. The ILO has promulgated 189 Conventions through 2016. These
instruments are adopted as conventions through its internal governance structure;
conventions that are then ratified by member States (at their option) essentially
function as treaties for purposes of implementation.
Conventions promulgated by the ILO aim to identify certain rights and protections
for individuals and to protect those individuals from transgression by their own
governments. As such, they lack the reciprocal compliance incentives that exist for
8
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international trade agreements or arms agreements between governments, where
a violation by State A may be met with a reciprocal violation by State B. If, for
example, Guatemala permits or participates in the imprisonment or murder of trade
union leaders, the U.S. is not going to respond or retaliate by imprisoning or murdering its own labor leaders. Thus, while ILO conventions create hard-law commitments
in that they are legally binding when ratified, these conventions have underlying
soft-law characteristics inasmuch as they are largely unenforceable through reciprocal
or other transnational means. Instead, they depend on domestic law enforcement for
effective implementation.
How does this domestic enforcement occur? Once a member State has ratified an
ILO convention, it is required to report regularly on measures taken to implement
the convention in law and practice, and to submit copies of this report to representative employer and worker organizations within the country. The ILO has developed
various means of supervising and monitoring convention implementation, principally
through the work of its three longstanding supervisory committees.
In essence, soft-law pressure comes from ongoing, participatory, and transparent
review of government reports addressed to compliance efforts. With ILO supervisory
committees providing coordination and input, assisted by worker representatives and
employer representatives from within the country, governments are strongly encouraged to be accurate about the extent to which their laws and practices conform to
ratified conventions, and responsive to suggestions or urgings about how to improve
those laws and practices. Since roughly 1990, ILO activities through convention ratifications, supervisory monitoring, and provision of technical support to governments
have had an increasing influence on the development of domestic labor laws.
ILO Norms and Trade Agreements
On a global scale, the number of free trade agreements (FTAs) containing labor
provisions has increased from four in 1995 to 76 as of December 2015; nearly half
of them came into existence after 2008. In the Americas, the U.S. has played a pivotal
role in negotiating these provisions—in regional trade agreements like NAFTA and
the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and in bilateral agreements
with Chile (2004), Peru (2007), Colombia (2012), and Panama (2012).
As a party to most FTAs in the Americas, the United States is persistent about
including a commitment to international standards on labor rights. Although
Congress has been generally uninterested in ratifying ILO standards for domestic
application, Congress since the Trade Act of 2002 has required that U.S. trade agreements aim “to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to promote
respect for core labor standards.” And the statute defines core labor standards to
track fundamental ILO norms. Labor provisions of U.S. trade agreements now
JAM ES J. B RU D N EY
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regularly feature linkages to ILO norms. These linkages have encouraged countries
to push domestic labor law reform toward compliance with international standards,
often as a condition of having the agreements ratified in the U.S. Even after ratification, changes in national labor laws have occurred in response to concerns raised
pursuant to these agreements by Congress, the Labor Department, or the U.S.
Trade Representative.
Notwithstanding the elevation of ILO norms in labor provisions of trade agreements, the impact on domestic labor laws and practices from such trade agreement
provisions has been somewhat limited. One important factor is that these labor
provisions are usually drafted to avoid a specific commitment to compliance with
ILO conventions. Over 70 percent of trade-related labor provisions make reference
to ILO instruments, but the vast majority of these incorporations are made explicitly
and exclusively to the ILO 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work, not to particular conventions. Inclusion of the Declaration has been beneficial in certain broad ways, but its use as a reference point is problematic from the
standpoint of domestic labor law reform.
For one thing, the exact scope and meaning of the Declaration are unclear. A
commitment to principles contained in the eight fundamental conventions appears
less binding than a commitment to adhere to conventions that a state has ratified.
Relatedly, the Declaration applies universally to all member states as an aspect of
ILO membership. This includes member states that have not ratified some or most
of the fundamental conventions (dealing with child labor, forced labor, nondiscrimination, and freedom of association). It therefore cannot obligate members to uphold
all the standards in these fundamental or core conventions.
In addition, certain structural aspects of trade agreement labor provisions have
impeded efforts to incorporate international norms into domestic labor law. These
trade agreements follow the state-focused “enforce your own labor laws” model,
established under NAFTA. As a matter of national sovereignty, the parties retain the
right to exercise reasonable discretion regarding regulatory and resource-allocation
matters, including options for enforcement among fundamental labor rights. The
internal state-focused model means that labor rights provisions in trade agreements
do not benefit from serious transnational oversight.
Trade agreement violations also require a showing that the failure to adopt or
maintain ILO fundamental principles has been done “in a manner affecting trade
or investment between the parties.” This language effectively subordinates labor law
protections to mercantile law. Even willful violations of statutory or constitutional
provisions that protect freedom of association or prohibit child labor do not warrant
intervention under the trade agreement unless it is proven that the violation is
directly impacting free trade.
10
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Finally, trade agreement labor provisions typically provide for a three-stage process
of enforcement: complaints addressed through consultations between governments;
followed by an intermediate stage of non-binding recommendations that may involve
an independent experts panel; and ultimately a final stage of arbitration and possible
sanctions. Disputes involving labor provisions almost never get past the initial
stage of consultation between governments, and resolutions are often inconclusive.
Perhaps as a result, complaints filed under NAFTA declined significantly after 1998,
and there have been relatively few complaints filed under the other trade agreements.
A recurring problem is that while trade unions and their supporters can file complaints and denounce failures to act on alleged interference with fundamental labor
rights, what happens to the complaint—how hard to push a case forward or whether
to push at all—is completely under government control. Governments generally
would prefer to negotiate diplomatic solutions with their trading partners behind
closed doors, rather than allow a more public airing of possibly serious violations
of domestic laws that are intended to embrace international norms. In more than
20 years of trade agreement labor provisions in the Americas, only a single case has
reached the final arbitration stage. That case took nine years from complaint to arbitral decision: while concluding that a Central American government had violated its
own labor laws, the arbitral panel found no persuasive proof of trade impact.
Sanctions are not a panacea for protecting labor rights enshrined in international
norms. Once a violation is established, any penalty substantial enough to have a
deterrent effect (such as either withdrawal of trade benefits or a severe fine) might
well cause more immediate harm to workers in the affected country—through lost
jobs—than to the offending government or the perpetrating employers. One could
argue that trade sanctions should target not the country as a whole or an entire industry but only the offending company or companies. And in some national settings,
a combination of positive incentives and more accurate information about working
conditions might yield better results than the threat of negative consequences for
noncompliance.
But whether incentives for compliance are positive or negative, if complaining parties—labor unions and employers—could continue to participate in and influence
the process, one result might be a more sustained interest in the capacity of trade
agreements to promote adherence to international labor norms. Importantly, the
successes of the ILO supervisory system are illustrative in this regard. Although they
lack authority to impose monetary or other sanctions, ILO supervisory mechanisms
feature a more transparent, ongoing, and participatory process. This process, devoted
to reporting and monitoring, and supplemented by the provision of technical
assistance, engages social partners (employer and worker organizations) as well as
governments in the effort to achieve compliance with ratified international labor law.

JAM ES J. B RU D N EY
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Protean Statutory Interpretation
in the Courts of Appeals
(with Lawrence Baum)
58 William & Mary Law Review (2017)
For the past several decades, debates over statutory interpretation have focused to
an extraordinary extent on the rise of textualism in the Supreme Court and the
consequent disagreements between textualists and purposivists. Legal scholars have
examined the Court’s growing appetite for dictionaries and canons, its diminished
attention to legislative history and purpose, and its evolving approach to the role of
agency deference. Largely overlooked in the debates is whether lower federal courts
practice what the Supreme Court has preached, or whether they ought to do so.
This Article explores how judges in the courts of appeals approach statutory interpretation under different terms of engagement. We examine empirically whether
circuit court judges embrace, or clash over, interpretive theories as the Justices have
so often done, or—alternatively—whether they apply textualist and purposive
resources in ways that are more pragmatic, and less dogmatic, than their Supreme
Court counterparts. We also address normatively whether courts of appeals ought
to follow a more eclectic and adaptable interpretive approach, given the divergent
institutional realities under which they decide cases.
Our analyses are based on a data set comprised of hundreds of federal appeals court
decisions in three circuits (Second, Seventh, and Tenth) covering three statutory
subject areas (criminal law, business and commercial law, and labor and employment
law) from September 2005 through May 2015, as well as Roberts Court decisions in
the same three fields over the same time period.
We find that the circuit courts display a kind of pragmatic adaptability in their
interpretive priorities, linked to factors that we contend are institutional and
resource-centric rather than ideological or doctrine-driven. Their protean stance
contrasts with the Supreme Court’s more self-consciously strategic, and at times dogmatic, approach to statutory interpretation. We believe the appeals court approach
reflects sound practical and reasonable normative considerations that offer useful
guidance for other lower courts and perhaps for the Supreme Court as well.

12
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Descriptive and Normative Aspects of Interpretive Divergence
A range of factors may contribute to divergent interpretive approaches between the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals. These factors reflect different institutional
structures and operational realities at the two judicial levels.
The Limited Role of Hierarchical Instruction
Unlike the value of precedent in substantive law, the Supreme Court’s approach to
interpretive methodology on statutory matters is not likely to dominate or substantially influence the ways that appeals courts construe federal statutes. In contrast to
constitutional doctrine (where the Court has the final word), Congress and agencies
have created virtually all federal statutory and regulatory law, and the Court has construed only a very small fraction of these provisions. Lower courts may not receive
the same degree of methodological guidance as the Court has provided with respect
to constitutional interpretation, where it is viewed as the almost-exclusive arbiter of
methodology as well as meaning.
Moreover, even if interpretive methodologies could be deemed tantamount to
precedent, there is nothing like that precedent to be found in Supreme Court
pronouncements. In recent decades, the Justices have articulated sharply divided
methodological views on statutory construction, ranging from ardent textualism
to respect for intentionalism or purposivism and recognition of a consequentialist
or pragmatic approach. These diverse methodologies do little to predict, much less
dictate, whether, how often, or to what extent judges should rely on dictionaries,
canons, legislative history, legislative inaction, a statute’s general purpose, or agency
deference.
The Repeat Player Effect
In the Supreme Court, nine repeat players hear and decide all cases together. In both
the Roberts and Rehnquist Court eras (1986–2017), there have been prolonged
periods of continuous membership with little or no change. This level of continuity
permits and may encourage a degree of methodological convergence, especially if
one Justice forcefully stakes out a position on the use or rejection of certain resources. Justice Scalia played that role during his tenure on the Roberts and Rehnquist
Courts with respect to increased reliance on dictionaries and canons, and the
diminished use of legislative history. Other Justices often went along out of collegial
respect or for strategic reasons.
By contrast, appeals court judges sit in panels of three, comprising a small fraction of
a circuit’s total membership. The participation of senior and visiting judges further
increases what would be frequent shifts in panel composition in any event. Further,
JAM ES J. B RU D N EY
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in part because of earlier retirement there tends to be less continuity of membership
in the courts of appeals than in the Supreme Court. In sum, there is relatively
limited opportunity for full-circuit conversation that might lead to consistency in
methodological approaches.
Resource Imbalance
Compared with the courts of appeals, the Supreme Court has a less demanding
caseload, greater access to law clerk and library support, and a wealth of briefs from
amici as well as parties. The Court issues seventy to eighty total decisions with
written opinions every year. By contrast, in 2015, the active judges on our three
circuits participated in a substantially larger number of cases decided on the merits,
from a mean of 253 cases per judge in the Tenth Circuit to 430 cases per judge
in the Second Circuit. This heavy volume means appeals courts are under pressure
to decide cases without spending much time reflecting on or wrestling with
methodological approaches.
The Judicial Selection Process
Just as Supreme Court decisions garner special political and media attention, so too
the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation processes are more ideologically
high-profile and politically polarized than those processes are for court of appeals
judges. One possible consequence is that candidates for the Supreme Court are required to articulate and defend “neutral” interpretive philosophies, and to repudiate
any dynamic or other “unconventional” interpretive impulses as antidemocratic.
These confirmation exchanges—reported in detail by mainstream and specialized
media—may contribute to the candidates acquiring methodological labels that
follow them onto the High Court bench. Moreover, once on the Court, Justices in
recent times have continued to expound on their interpretive philosophies through
extrajudicial speeches and media appearances—at times defending their own neutrality while criticizing colleagues for judicial activism.
While appeals court judges are not immune from such confirmation-related attention or post-appointment celebrity, their interpretive approaches generally receive
far less congressional, interest group, or media scrutiny. This may, in turn, result in
their feeling less constrained or self-conscious as they subsequently develop their
own approaches to statutory construction problems and challenges—contributing,
albeit in ways that would be difficult to measure, to more eclectic and adaptable
interpretive perspectives.

14
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Some of these factors may have more explanatory value than others. But one
important takeaway is the likelihood of a genuine divergence between statutory
interpretation methods at the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals.
Normative Implications
An intriguing and important normative question is whether, given that appeals
courts turn out to be more pragmatic and adaptable—and less dogmatic—than the
Supreme Court in their interpretive methods, such a protean approach is preferable
to a more self-consciously strategic or opinionated one.
Having established [in extensive empirical sections omitted here] that there are in fact
salient differences in interpretive approach between the two judicial levels, we can
identify several possible benefits to the pragmatism and adaptability favored by the
courts of appeals.
One benefit is epistemological. The protean approach assumes that, except for
disputes where a law’s directive is unassailably clear, consideration of more resources rather than fewer tends to expand judicial knowledge and sophistication when
resolving even arguably ambiguous or inconclusive statutory language. While text
remains the starting point and the most authoritative source for appeals court judges,
purpose, intent, and practical impact may all become relevant under a given set of
facts and circumstances. Considering these additional sources of potential insight
also minimizes the risk of subjective detours—at least for judges who approach
each interpretive dispute on its own terms rather than as part of a larger doctrinal
construct.
A second benefit of the protean approach is its democratizing influence. In appropriate circumstances, a degree of skepticism about textual certainty is accompanied
by attention to what the politically accountable branches have said regarding the
meaning of disputed text—through potentially relevant legislative history and
agency constructions. Consideration of these resources may in the end prove less
than helpful. But the exercise of doing so represents an integration (as opposed to a
reordering) of authority sources from the three branches; in that subtle respect, it is
a humbling process for the judiciary.
A final benefit of the protean approach is that its ad hoc qualities serve as a check
on the prospect of methodological stare decisis power from the Supreme Court.
The vast majority of appeals court fare involves statutory disputes that are not close
to certworthy. And in those instances, the range of distinguishing factors between
Supreme Court and appeals court cases—stemming from factors such as dissimilarities in workload, legal complexity, policy implications, lawyering resources, and
repeat-player culture—justifies the divergent approach.
JAM ES J. B RU D N EY
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To be clear, the benefits of a protean approach need not be limited to appeals court
decision-making. If the Justices were to announce their own commitment to such
an approach—a pragmatic and adaptable standard rather than one or more sets of
prescriptive rules—such a standard could well serve as flexible guidance for lower
federal courts. We assume that circuit court judges would accord respect to this type
of guidance, both because it integrates the importance of situation-specific methodological analysis and because it reinforces circuit judges’ predilections to approach
statutory interpretation in this adaptable way. For now, though, the Supreme Court
has issued no such guidance; instead, the Justices remain largely divided along textualist and purposivist lines.
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Education
J.D., Yale Law School
M.A. and B.A., Oxford University
B.A., Amherst College
Experience
Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law
Chief Counsel and Staff Director, United States Senate Subcommittee on Labor
Attorney (Labor and Employment Law Practice), Bredhoff & Kaiser
Clerk, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, U.S. Supreme Court
Clerk, Judge Gerhard A. Gesell, U.S. District Court, Washington, D.C.
Honors and Associations
Dean’s Distinguished Research Award, Fordham Law School
Professor of the Year, Fordham Law School
Alumni Award for Distinguished Teaching, Ohio State University
Quid Pro Quo Award, Moritz College of Law
Simson Faculty Excellence Award, Moritz College of Law
Fulbright Distinguished Scholar Award, Oxford University
Outstanding Professor, Moritz College of Law
Selected Recent Publications
“The Internationalization of Sources of Labor Law,” 39 University of Pennsylvania Journal of
International Law ___ (forthcoming 2017)
“Legislative Underwrites,” 103 Virginia Law Review ___ (forthcoming 2017) (with
Ethan J. Leib)
“Contextualizing Shadow Conversations,” 166 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online
37 (2017)
“Protean Statutory Interpretation in the Courts of Appeals,” 58 William & Mary Law
Review 681 (2017) (with Lawrence Baum)
“Dictionaries 2.0: Exploring the Gap Between the Supreme Court and the Courts of
Appeals,” 125 The Yale Law Journal Forum 104 (2015) (with Lawrence Baum)
“Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace: Unhappy Together,” 83 Fordham Law Review 497
(2014)
“Envisioning Enforcement of Freedom of Association Standards in Corporate Codes: A
Journey for Sinbad or Sisyphus?” 33 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 553 (2012)
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Nestor M. Davidson

The Albert A. Walsh ’54 Chair in Real Estate, Land Use,
and Property Law
In legal scholarship, administrative law is almost always synonymous
with federal government. Professor Nestor Davidson, a nationally
renowned real estate, land use, and property law scholar, shines light
on the massive, submerged, and surprisingly vibrant domain of the
“administrative city-state,” where local governments hold significant
authority to formulate their own responses to pressing issues, such as
climate change, immigration, and the refugee crisis, that are often mired
in gridlock at the federal government level.
Davidson joined the Fordham Law faculty in 2011, after teaching at
the University of Colorado Law School, serving as special counsel and
principal deputy general counsel at the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development, and practicing at Latham and
Watkins, where he focused on commercial real estate and affordable
housing. Davidson earned his A.B. from Harvard College and his J.D. from
Columbia Law School. After law school, he clerked for Judge David S.
Tatel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and
Justice David H. Souter of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Davidson’s recent article “Localist Administrative Law” provides
a descriptive foundation for understanding the nature of local
administration, outlining how local government differs in structure from
its federal counterpart, the need for courts working with local agencies
to show sensitivity to the context of formality and informality, and the
import of courts viewing local experts as a mediating body between the
community and local government.
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EXC E R P T

Localist Administrative Law
126 Yale Law Journal 564 (2017)
In the waning days of Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration, the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene promulgated a regulation that
would have limited sales based on the portion size of so-called “sugary” drinks.1
This effort was the best-known—and arguably the most controversial—of a long
series of public-health rules from the agency that included smoking restrictions, a
ban on trans fats, and a mandate for listing calorie counts in restaurants.2 Before
the portion-limit regulation could take effect, however, the New York state courts
invalidated it on grounds seemingly familiar to any scholar of administrative law:
separation of powers and the nondelegation doctrine.3
What is distinctive about this controversy is not that the judiciary found that an
administrative agency had overstepped its bounds; that much is relatively banal, although not without its problems in this particular case. It is, rather, that the relevant
agency promulgating the rule at issue was part of a local government.
In legal scholarship, administrative law is almost always synonymous with federal administrative law.4 The institutional frameworks, doctrinal questions, and theoretical
concerns that drive the voluminous literature on administrative law almost exclusively take the alphabet soup of federal executive-branch agencies, acting pursuant
to statutes enacted by Congress and overseen by Article III courts, as the reigning
paradigm. The preoccupations and prescriptions of mainstream administrative law
accordingly flow from this institutional and regulatory context.5
1 24 Rules of the City of N.Y. § 81.53 (2013), invalidated by N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014); see also Pekham Pal, History,
Governmental Structure, and Politics: Defining the Scope of Local Board of Health Power, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 769,
790–96 (2015) (reviewing the portion-cap litigation).
2 See Paul A. Diller, Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of Woodrow Wilson, 40
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1859, 1864–65 (2013).
3 See Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 16 N.E.3d at 549.
4 See, e.g., William Funk, Beyond Casebooks, Beyond Treatises: Administrative Law Readers, 9 Admin. L.J. Am. U.
361, 364 (1995) (book review) (noting—and lamenting—that the three leading administrative law anthologies were
“devoted exclusively to federal administrative law”).
5 There is a body of state administrative law scholarship that has produced notable contributions. See, e.g., Michael
Asimow & Ronald M. Levin, State and Federal Administrative Law (4th ed. 2014); Michael Asimow, The Fourth
Reform: Introduction to the Administrative Law Review Symposium on State Administrative Law, 53 Admin. L.
Rev. 395 (2001); Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 Va. L. Rev. 297 (1986);
Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their Implications for Improving
the Chevron Doctrine, 39 McGeorge L. Rev. 977 (2008); Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative
Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 551 (2001); Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State
Administrative Law, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 555 (2014). This state-level administrative law can help explicate the
contours of local-government practice, but the Article will focus on federal-local distinctions for the sake of clarifying
contrast. Before the rise of the modern administrative state, sub-federal institutions unsurprisingly were more central
to conceptions of administration, as the prominence of two turn-of-the-century non-federal cases involving challenges
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This myopic federal focus obscures a massive, submerged, and surprisingly vibrant
domain of administration that exists at the local-government level. Nested within
the tens of thousands of cities, suburbs, towns, and counties that span the country is
a vast panoply of local agencies with significant frontline regulatory responsibility.
These agencies work in policy domains as varied as economic regulation, public
health, land use, policing, environmental protection, education, public benefits, and
consumer welfare. It is no exaggeration that almost every area of local governance
operates through myriad zoning boards, education departments, police commissions, motor vehicle bureaus, social-service agencies, and similar institutions. If, as
the introduction to a leading casebook on local-government law puts it, three core
relationships have traditionally defined the field—those “between cities and higher
levels of government, between neighboring cities, and between cities and the people
who live within their boundaries”6—then local administration represents a crucial
fourth relationship—between and among institutions within local governments.
Political scientists, economists, and scholars of public management have long
grappled with the interplay between bureaucracy and democracy at the local level.
Yet legal scholars have been oddly absent from this discourse, paying too little
attention to the inner workings of local government in general7—and even less to
the important arena of local agency practice8—despite the voluminous literature on
administrative law and practice that predominates at the federal level. This is
unfortunate, because the administrative state that exists at the local-government
level—one might call it the administrative city-state—is every bit as worthy of
scholarly examination as its more familiar federal counterpart.9
to tax assessments—Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)—in the canon of administrative law suggests. Cf. Ronald A. Cass,
Models of Administrative Action, 72 Va. L. Rev. 363, 367–70 (1986) (discussing Londoner and Bi-Metallic as canonical
polestars of models of administration that parallel adjudication and legislation).
6 Gerald E. Frug, Richard T. Ford & David J. Barron, Local Government Law: Cases and Materials vi (5th ed. 2010).
7 Much of the literature on local-government law falls into two broad categories. In the first, paralleling Frug, Ford,
and Barron’s typology, see id., scholars focus on transsubstantive determinants of local legal identity. This strand of
the literature tends to examine issues such as authority, autonomy, boundaries, incorporation, and the like. A second
category focuses on specific areas of policy concern, such as land use, education, policing, public benefits, and the like.
Although both of these strands of the literature are important, this Article argues for a more explicitly institutionalist
approach, because questions of internal governmental structure matter at the local level no less than at the federal level.
8 Paul Diller’s work on local public-health agencies is a rare (and excellent) recent exception. See Diller, supra note
2; see also Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 Wash. U. L.
Rev. 1219 (2014).
Local administrative law was once not quite as obscure a field of inquiry. In the early 1960s, Bernie Burrus
published a slim but insightful book on local administration, seeking (it turned out, sadly, in vain) to spark a broader
discourse about the subject. See Bernie R. Burrus, Administrative Law and Local Government (1963); see also Max
A. Pock, Administrative Law and Local Government, 43 Tex. L. Rev. 123, 123 (1964) (reviewing Burrus, supra). In
addition to Burrus’s now largely forgotten volume, Harry Wallace, the respected former Dean of Indiana Law School,
published more than one edition of his casebook on the subject, with the final edition appearing in 1972. See Leon
Harry Wallace, Local Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (1972).
9 In essence, local agency practice is local governance. As Niels Ejersbo and James Svara have argued, “[b]ureaucracy
constitutes the core organizational capacity of local governments to carry out the government’s work of enforcing laws, implementing policies, and delivering services.” Niels Ejersbo & James H. Svara, Bureaucracy and Democracy in Local Government,
in The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics 152, 152 (Karen Mossberger, Susan E. Clarke & Peter John eds., 2012).
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When one turns the lens on the metaphorical microscope, what does local administration actually look like? It is difficult to generalize, given the number and variety of local
agencies, but several themes emerge. First, as noted, local agencies reflect the breadth
of the work of local governments. Agencies are involved in the delivery of core local
services, such as education, policing, and sanitation, often the functions most closely
identified with local governments.10 But it is easy to forget that local governments also
exercise significant regulatory authority, delegated from the state government or under
“home rule.”11 Local agencies, for example, set the rules and oversee the functioning of
many aspects of the built environment—through zoning, subdivision rules, building
and housing codes, and similar statutory regimes. They also regulate significant aspects
of local economies, including wage and hour rules, workplace conditions, and antidiscrimination requirements. And an increasingly important aspect of local regulation
involves the environment. Much of local agencies’ work across policy areas happens
through licensing,12 but local agencies also engage in traditional direct regulation.
If this is what local agencies do, what can be discerned about the legal and institutional
contexts in which they operate? Local agencies are not simply junior-league counterparts to federal agencies. While there are some local governments—particularly in
larger cities such as New York—that have surface resemblance to the federal threebranch paradigm, most have distinctly different structures.13 For example, many local
governments have little or no formal separation of powers, with lawmaking authority
often vested in a unified legislative-executive body. The “mayor” in these jurisdictions,
if there is one, is just another council member. Even for those local governments that
have a recognizable independent chief executive, that executive’s ability to directly
oversee agencies is often circumscribed.14 And many local agencies are subject to quite
limited electoral accountability, reporting to the state or entirely lacking a relevant,
direct electoral mechanism of any sort.15
10 See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 85–86 (1998) (discussing the most common local services).
11 David Barron and Gerald Frug have argued that the scope of local authority is not a Manichean all-or-nothing
divide between empowerment and disability, but rather a more subtle interplay of both. See Gerald E. Frug & David
J. Barron, City Bound: How States Stifle Urban Innovation (2008). Frug and Barron tend to ignore a third source of
authority and limitation at the local-government level, deriving from the federal government’s local role. See Nestor M.
Davidson, Leaps and Bounds, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 957, 965 (2010) (reviewing Frug & Barron, supra).
12 When Bernie Burrus set out to explicate the then-state of local administrative law in the 1960s, he chose licensing
as his paradigm example. See Burrus, supra note 8, at 41–71. The use of franchise authority is another prominent
regulatory strategy at the local level. See Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 795, 828–29 (2012)
(discussing local cable franchise agreements as a form of regulation).
13 See Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev.
339, 341 (1993) (“Local government is strikingly different from other levels of government, and not simply because
local governments are territorially smaller. Local government organization does not abide by the ‘plain vanilla’ model
characteristic of state or federal government: a single legislative body with general lawmaking powers over a broad
jurisdiction with democratic accountability to the residents of that jurisdiction. Instead, specialization, fragmentation,
overlap, and boundary change are pervasive characteristics of our local government structure ....” (footnote omitted)).
14 Many mayors, for example, entirely lack appointment and/or removal power over the heads of local administrative
agencies.
15 Indeed, the fact that local agencies answer both to their own local governments and to the state is a distinctive
feature of local administration. See Diller, supra note 2, at 1867–83.
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While some local agencies, moreover, are well staffed and operate as formally as any
federal agency, local administration tends to work more informally. Indeed, the precise procedural requirements binding local agencies are often surprisingly murky.16
Local agencies also often operate at the edge of a blurry line between governmental
action and public participation. Community engagement in zoning regulation,
school board decisions, police review commissions, and other examples of the blending of public and private underscore the breadth of citizen participation in local
agency work that is uncommon at the federal level. And local-government functions
can be entirely privatized, including some administration. All of these variations
inform this Article’s first aim—providing a descriptive foundation to understand the
nature and work of local administration.
Shifting from this empirical grounding to doctrinal questions, this Article argues
that these features of local agency context and practice should shape a new, distinctly localist administrative jurisprudence. Courts—and it is mostly state courts that
review local agency action—engage in judicial review across a variety of contexts,
from statutory interpretation, to substantive agency policymaking, to policing the
bounds of procedural regularity. When they do, they should attend to four particularly salient aspects of the local context.
First, rather than importing federal—or even state—administrative law norms wholesale, courts should be clear-eyed about the doctrinal implications of local governmental
structure and the complex nature of delegated authority for local agencies. Courts
should consider, for example, whether limits on executive oversight militate against
deference, or whether the absence of separation of powers in a local government might
change the nature of the nondelegation doctrine. Similarly, the fact that many local
agencies have two layers of oversight—by their local and state governments—may
mitigate concerns about capture, corruption, and faithless agents. In these and many
other ways, the details of local governmental structure matter for judicial review.
Second, courts should be sensitive to the contexts for formality and informality in
the work of local agencies. In most instances, as with the approach that courts take
when scaling deference in reviewing federal administration,17 formality should be
accorded judicial respect. Where an agency has acted through legislatively prescribed procedure or adopted careful processes of its own, with substantial evidence
when appropriate, that should merit deference, all other things being equal. On the
other hand, more so than at the federal level, there are contexts where the relative
informality of local practice, particularly to the extent that such informality reflects
16 Many local agencies are not bound by state Administrative Procedure Acts, although that does not mean that
they are entirely free from procedural constraints. As a result, local agencies have been a particular flashpoint for due
process concerns. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373
(1908).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001).
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community involvement, may be consistent with norms of considered judgment.
Third, courts should be attentive to the role of private parties and the community in
local administration. The scope of private involvement—both within traditionally
governmental entities and through privatization—can be a rationale for the kind of
vigorous nondelegation doctrine seen in local administrative law (by stark contrast
to federal law). But the porous line between public and private at the local level can
also weigh in favor of a more pragmatic approach to nondelegation, so long as that
approach is undertaken with appropriate caution.
Finally, reviewing courts should take a nuanced view of local agency expertise.
In some contexts, this is as straightforward as crediting local technical experts, as
with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, a nationally
recognized leader in public health. In other contexts, however, agencies serve less
as a repository of technical expertise and more as a mediating body to channel local
input and knowledge. This is still valuable expertise, but of a different sort than the
kind of scientific or industry-specific knowledge with which courts credit federal
agencies.
Beyond jurisprudence, a final aim of this Article is to begin to illuminate ways in
which the intersection of localism and administration has deep relevance for the literature in each domain. For scholars of local-government law, focusing on the work
of agencies adds a layer of institutional depth to longstanding debates balancing
local authority, community, democracy, and experimentalism against concerns about
parochialism and exclusion. For administrative law scholars, adding an understanding of local administration to debates that are largely focused on the federal level
complicates questions of the institutional predicates for administrative legitimacy,
but also holds promise for developing a more coherent administrative law across the
entire range of our vertical federalist system.
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America’s growing multiracial population has prompted some scholars
to posit racial mixture will prove an antidote to racism in the United States.
Professor Tanya Hernández, an internationally recognized comparative
race law expert, pushes back against this false assumption, arguing the
law must continue to provide strong protections against discrimination
of people who are perceived as non-white including those who identify
as multiracial.
Hernández, a Fordham Law faculty member since 2009, is the associate
director and head of global and comparative law programs and initiatives
for Fordham Law’s Center on Race, Law & Justice. In 2015, she was
awarded Fulbright Specialist grants to consult on racial equality projects
at Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense in Paris and University
of the West Indies Law School in Trinidad. Before joining Fordham
Law, Hernández served on the full-time faculty at George Washington
University Law School, Rutgers University School of Law, and St. John’s
University School of Law. She received her A.B. from Brown University
and her J.D. from Yale Law School.
In her most recent article, “Racially-Mixed Personal Identity Equality,”
Hernández writes that the emergence of Americans identifying as mixedrace or multiracial—rather than pointing to a need for a shift away from
existing civil rights laws, as some scholars have concluded—indicates
the need for further support of the current structures. Hernández will
examine racial identity further in her forthcoming book Multiracials and
Civil Rights: Are Mixed-Race Stories of Discrimination a New Kind of Racism?
(NYU Press).
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Racially-Mixed Personal Identity
Equality
15 Law, Culture and the Humanities Journal 1 (2017)
The growth of a mixed-race population in the United States that identifies itself as
“multiracial” has commanded public attention. The U.S. Census Bureau began permitting respondents to simultaneously select multiple racial categories to designate
their multiracial backgrounds with the 2000 Census. With the release of data for
both the 2000 and 2010 census years, much media attention has followed the fact
that first 2.4% and then 2.9% of the population selected two or more races.1 The
Census Bureau projects that the self-identified multiracial population will triple by
2060.2 Scholars have documented how the mainstream press has universally celebrated the growth of a multiracial identified population “as the end of race as we know
it.”3 At the same time, advertisers have seized upon the interest in “racially ambiguous” and presumably mixed-race appearances for marketing numerous products.4
The public fascination with multiracial identity has promoted the belief that racial
mixture will, in and of itself, destroy racism. For instance, leaders for the recognition
of a “multiracial” census category frequently posit that multiracials are a “unifying
force,”5 on the theory that multiracial individuals “as a group may be the embodiment of America’s best chance to clean up race relations.”6 Indeed, the equating
of racial mixture with racial harmony is often quite explicit. Harvard sociologist
Orlando Patterson agrees: “[i]f your object is the eventual integration of the races, a
mixed-race or middle group is something you’d want to see developing.... The middle
group grows larger and larger, and the races eventually blend.”7 The multiracial discourse narrative thus posits that “mixing away” racism will absolve the nation from
having to address entrenched racial disparities in socioeconomic opportunity.8
1 Nicholas A. Jones and Jungmiwha Bullock, U.S. Census Bureau, “The Two or More Races Population: 2010
Census Briefs,” September 2012, https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-13.pdf (accessed February
16, 2017).
2 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “Multiracial in America: Proud, Diverse and Growing in
Numbers,” June 11, 2015, The Pew Research Center 2015. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/06/11/multiracialin-america/ (accessed February 16, 2017), p. 1.
3 Catherine R. Squires, Dispatches from the Color Line: The Press and Multiracial America (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2007), p. 20.
4 Kimberly McClain DaCosta, Making Multiracials: State, Family and Market in the Redrawing of the Color Line
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 171.
5 Review of Federal Measurements of Race and Ethnicity: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Census, Statistics
and Postal Personnel of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 103d Cong. (1993), p. 171 [hereinafter
Multiracial Hearings] (testimony of Carlos Fernández, President, Association of MultiEthnic Americans).
6 Ramona E. Douglass, “Multiracial People Must No Longer Be Invisible,” New York Times, July 12, 1996, p. A26.
7 Tom Morganthau, “What Color Is Black?,” Newsweek, Feb. 13, 1995, pp. 63, 65.
8 Jim Chen, “Unloving,” Iowa Law Review, 80 (1994), pp. 145–75.
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The fascination with multiracial identity has also entered the legal context.
Specifically, the presence of fluid mixed-race racial identities within allegations of
discrimination leads some legal scholars to conclude that civil rights laws are in
urgent need of reform because they were built upon a strictly binary foundation
of blackness and whiteness. Building upon the social movement for recognition of
multiracial identity on the census and generally, scholars conclude that courts misunderstand the nature of discrimination against mixed-race persons when they do not
specifically acknowledge the distinctiveness of their multiracial identity. Even United
States Supreme Court litigation has begun to associate the growth of multiracial
identity with the obsolescence of civil rights policies. Particularly worrisome has
been the judicial suggestion that the growth of multiracial identity undercuts the legitimacy of affirmative action policies that have long sought to pursue racial equality.
The supposition that the multiracial experience of discrimination is exceptional,
and not well understood or handled by present anti-discrimination law, is evident in the publications of several multiracial-identity scholars. I coin the term
“multiracial-identity scholars” to refer to authors whose scholarship promotes the
recognition of the distinct challenges that multiracial identity now presumably
presents for civil rights law.9 For instance, the central claim in Nancy Leong’s much
cited article “Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimination”10 is that mixed-race
discrimination claims are not properly administered by the legal system because
the mixed-race specificity of the claims is ignored. Building upon Leong’s analysis,
Scot Rives and Tina Fernandes each in turn assert that the legal system is unable to
address the “unique harms” of multiracial complaints without a specific “multiracial
category” in anti-discrimination jurisprudence.11 In turn, Leora Eisenstadt includes
multiracial identity within her call for reforms for the evolution of “fluid identity
discrimination” 12 that parallels Camille Gear Rich’s premise that multiracial claims
present “special challenges for antidiscrimination law” that necessitate an “elective
race” approach.13
The crux of the multiracial identity scholar critique of the emerging cases is that
courts often reframe multiracial plaintiffs’ self-identities by describing mixed race

9 Leora F. Eisenstadt, “Fluid Identity Discrimination,” American Business Law Journal 52 (2015), pp. 789–857;
Tina Fernandes, “Antidiscrimination Law and the Multiracial Experience: A Reply to Nancy Leong,” Hastings Race
& Poverty Law Journal 10 (2013), pp. 191–217; Nancy Leong, “Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimination”
American University Law Review 59 (2010), pp. 469–555; Camille Gear Rich, “Elective Race: Recognizing Race
Discrimination in the Era of Racial Self-Identification,” Georgetown Law Journal 102 (2014): 1501–1572, 1533; Scot
Rives, “Multiracial Work: Handing Over the Discretionary Judicial Tool of Multiracialism, U.C.L.A. Law Review 58
(2011), pp. 1303–1340.
10 Leong, “Judicial Erasure,” pp. 469–555.
11 Fernandes, “Antidiscrimination Law and the Multiracial Experience,” pp. 191–217; Rives, “Multiracial Work,” p.
1334.
12 Leora F. Eisenstadt, “Fluid Identity Discrimination,” American Business Law Journal 52 (2015), pp. 840–45.
13 Rich, “Elective Race,” p. 1533.
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plaintiffs as “mono-racial” minority individuals.14 Specifically, in many cases, judges
refer to mixed-race complainants as solely African American or black.15 These
scholars take issue with this characterization, arguing it hinders the recognition of
the racial discrimination that multiracial individuals experience. This essay disputes
that premise because the cases themselves illuminate the disjuncture between the
theoretical critique they make and the actual adequacy of the judicial administration
of the claims.
Specifically, a close examination of such claims indicates that in an overwhelming
number of the cases scholars rely on, the facts present a complainant whose description of the alleged discrimination includes pointed, derogatory comments about
non-whiteness and blackness in particular.16 The overarching commonality in the
cases is the exceptionalism of blackness and non-whiteness, rather than multiraciality, as subject to victimization. Although the plaintiffs may personally identify as
multiracial persons, they present allegations of public discrimination rooted in a specific non-whiteness and often black bias that is not novel or particular to mixed-race
persons, nor especially difficult for judges to understand. For instance, the employment discrimination case of Jill Mitchell presents a paradigmatic illustration of the
adequacy of current law to address the racial discrimination that multiracial-identified persons encounter.
Jill Mitchell is a light-skinned biracial woman with a black father and white mother. Based on her appearance, many people presume she is of mixed Hispanic and
European descent. Mitchell started working for Champs Sports in Beaumont, Texas,
in 1996 as a full-time management trainee. She worked for a year without incident
and received praise about her work performance. But she felt her entire work experience changed once her store manager discovered that her racial background included
African ancestry despite the fact that Mitchell did not disclose her race on her job
application and declined to identify her racial background when asked during the
job interview. The manager deduced Mitchell’s racial background from the repeated
visits to the store from her darker-skinned relatives and friends.
Mitchell says the manager’s “attitude towards her changed dramatically” as he fixated
on her African ancestry.17 He often made negative remarks about blacks to Mitchell
and, on one occasion, remarked to Mitchell that “she only dated black men”18 as
14 Leong, “Judicial Erasure,” pp. 472, 511. It should be noted that Tina Fernandes and Scot Rives endorse the
entirety of Leong’s critique and only depart in how they think the legal system should respond.
15 See, e.g., Callicutt v. Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc., No. CIV. 00–95DWFAJB, 2002 WL 992757, at *1 (D. Minn.
May 13, 2002).
16 Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Multiracial in the Workplace: A New Kind of Discrimination?” in Margaret F.
Karsten, ed., Gender, Race and Ethnicity, in the Workplace: Emerging Issues and Enduring Challenges (Santa Barbara,
CA: Praeger ABC-CLIO, 2016), pp. 3–25.
17 Mitchell v. Champs Sports, 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
18 Op. cit., p. 646.
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if that were problematic. At one point Mitchell overheard the manager state, “We
need to get her out of here.” The store manager’s racialized treatment of Mitchell
continued until she was eventually demoted, and her former position was filled with
a white employee who came not from the ranks of the established management
trainee program like herself but instead from the part-time hires.19 As a result she
attributed her demotion to race discrimination and filed an employment discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.20
Jill Mitchell’s chances for winning her lawsuit were quite low, not because of the
relative merits of her claim but because it has been empirically documented that few
complaints of racial discrimination ever yield success for claimants.21 The vast majority of racial discrimination claims are dismissed by courts without the opportunity
for a trial. Commentators attribute the low success rate to the growing hostility with
which courts approach allegations of discrimination.22 Courts seemingly believe
that the passage of civil rights laws alone has wrought a post-racial society in which
instances of discrimination are rare.23
Despite the overarching challenge of persuading courts that an instance of discrimination has actually occurred, Jill Mitchell’s motion for court-appointed counsel
was granted, with the court noting that “the merits of Mitchell’s allegations weigh
in favor of granting the motion.”24 While the published opinion does not entail a
substantive resolution of the discrimination charge, it is still quite a victory in the
context of contemporary judicial animosity to any discrimination claim. Here the
court simultaneously endorses the merits of the claim of discrimination and authorizes the funds for a court-appointed lawyer. This is rare in any civil case let alone an
employment discrimination case. Indeed, it seems likely from the record that after
Mitchell obtained a court-appointed lawyer, a confidential settlement agreement was
reached in the case because Mitchell requested that the lawsuit be dismissed with
prejudice rather than proceed with a judicial inquiry.
What then do multiracial-identity scholars find problematic about the judicial
administration of this biracial-identified claimant? Throughout the opinion, the
court refers to Mitchell as “black.”25 For the multiracial-identity scholars, the court’s
singular focus on blackness means that despite the favorable outcome, the court failed
19 Op. cit., pp. 646–47.
20 Op. cit., p. 647.
21 Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert L. Nelson, “Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment
Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System,” Wisconsin Law Review 2005 (2005), pp. 663–711.
22 Stewart J. Schwab, “Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?” Harv. Law &
Policy Review 3 (1995), p. 104.
23 Tanya Katerí Hernández, “One Path for ‘Post-Racial’ Employment Discrimination Cases—The Implicit
Association Test Research as Social Framework Evidence,” Journal of Law & Inequality 32 (2014), p. 307.
24 Mitchell, at 650.
25 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 645–47 & 650.
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to recognize the possibility that Mitchell’s mistreatment was the product of antimultiracial bias.26 From their perspective, the court’s oversimplified reference to
Mitchell as black is analytically problematic despite the fact that the court also
emphatically states that Mitchell has a discrimination claim that should proceed
and warrants the dedication of public resources in a court-appointed attorney.
However, the court’s oversimplification of the claimant’s racial identity in court
documents parallels the singular salience of blackness that Mitchell’s own narrative
raises. Nor can the black-focus of her own factual allegations be dismissed as the
strategic coaching of an attorney seeking to situate the case into the traditional
paradigm of white-versus-black racism, because Mitchell represented herself, and the
black-focused narrative appeared in her own testimony before the Magistrate Judge
in her hearing to request court-appointed counsel. In fact, 39% of the multiracial
workplace discriminations cases I assessed were filed by complainants representing themselves and using their own words to describe how they felt targeted and
harmed.27 Thus, the recurrent theme of the primacy of bias against non-whiteness
and anti-blackness specifically is not a lawyer’s strategic construct. The Mitchell
case then is inappropriately labeled by multiracial-identity scholars as illustrating
a judicial confusion about the nature of multiracial discrimination or the inadequacy of the existing antidiscrimination legal framework. Instead, the Mitchell case
demonstrates the coherence of judicially focusing on blackness when the claimant
articulates a factual pattern enmeshed in anti-black bias. Like Jill Mitchell’s case, the
vast majority of multiracial stories of discrimination entail allegations of non-white
or specifically anti-black bias rather than prejudice rooted in hostility toward racial
mixture itself.28
In short, the increase in the number of individuals identifying as mixed-race or
multiracial does not present unique challenges to the pursuit of political equality
inasmuch as the cases are mired in a long-existing morass of bias against non-whiteness and its intimate connection to white supremacy. Rather than point to a need
for a shift away from the existing civil rights laws, the cases instead indicate the need
for further support of the current structures. The multiracial discrimination cases
highlight the continued need for attention to white supremacy and for fortifying
the focus of civil rights law on racial privilege and the lingering legacy of bias against
non-whites.

26 Leong, “Judicial Erasure,” pp. 512–13.
27 Hernández, “Multiracials in the Workplace.”
28 Tanya Katerí Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights (New York: NYU Press, forthcoming 2017).
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The Empirical Turn in Family Law
118 Columbia Law Review (forthcoming 2018)
At the crux of the fight over marriage equality, a court in Northern California conducted a remarkable twelve-day trial.1 Faced with a challenge to the state’s marriage
restriction, the court heard evidence on a range of social facts relating to family
structure and child outcomes, the physical and economic benefits of marriage, the
nature of sexual orientation, and the increased risk of physical and mental harm from
discrimination and stigma.2 This empirical evidence was pivotal to the court’s decision
striking down the marriage restriction. A crucial part of the decision was the finding
that children of same-sex parents have similar outcomes to children raised by different-sex couples, undermining California’s rationale for differentiating couples based
on sexual orientation.3
This example of relying on empirical evidence—defined broadly as research and data
gathered through both quantitative and qualitative methods4—to resolve fundamental questions of family law is hardly isolated. Consistent with an increasingly
widespread reliance on empirical evidence across sectors of the economy, academic
disciplines, and within the law,5 family-law decisionmakers regularly draw on sociology, psychology, neuroscience, data analytics, and related social and hard sciences to
make critical choices about the legal regulation of families. In addition to using empirical evidence to decide constitutional cases, courts turn to psychological research
about parental alienation syndrome to decide custody.6 Lawmakers draw on studies
about the harms of foster care to drastically revamp the child welfare system.7 And
agency officials mine data about risk factors for child abuse and neglect to construct
predictive analytics for family intervention.8
1 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2010), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see Kenji Yoshino, Speak Now: Marriage Equality on Trial 91–228
(2015) (describing the trial in detail).
2 See Perry, 704 F. Supp. at 932–38.
3 See id. at 935, 950, 963–73, 981, 994–1003.
4 This Essay loosely contrasts this empirical information with values, a longstanding if contested distinction. See
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 497–521 (P.H. Nidditch & L.A. Selby-Bigge eds., 2d ed. 1978) (1739–
1740). As explored throughout this Essay, the line between empirics and values is blurred, and one often informs the
other. Empirics can influence values in numerous ways identified in this Essay, but values can also influence empirics,
partly because knowledge is inherently situated in culture. This is particularly true in social science, but it can also be
true in the hard sciences. The political and cultural valence of juvenile crime, for example, accounts at least in part for
the research agenda of neuroscientists interested in adolescent brain development. See generally Hilary Putnam,
The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, 28–45 (2004) (demonstrating how the distinction
between facts and values breaks down in numerous ways); Ruth Anna Putnam, Creating Facts and Values, 60 Phil.
187, 190–204 (1985) (arguing that facts are value-laden and values are fact-laden).
5 See text accompanying notes 28–37.
6 See infra Part I.B.1.e.
7 See infra Part I.B.2.
8 See id.
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Despite this stark shift in family law, there is limited, albeit growing, scholarly
attention to the subject. Some family law scholars have explored the use of empirical
evidence in specific contexts,9 but few interrogate or analyze the larger trend.10
There is much to celebrate about this empirical turn in family law. Traditionally,
decisionmakers in family law have drawn on a combination of moral judgments,
prevailing cultural norms, and their perception of common-sense.11 An empirical
grounding for family law has considerable advantages over this historical approach.
A detailed understanding of family life and the legal system is essential to devel
oping effective rules. Rigorous consideration of empirical evidence can guide state
investments, promoting the efficient and effective use of scarce resources, and it
can give decisionmakers a clearer sense of where legal inputs might yield particular
social outcomes. It can help family law be more inclusive and move beyond narrow
dominant norms. And it holds the potential to help de-politicize battles over family
recognition and support, or at least to separate political arguments and social beliefs

9 See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender and Parentage: Family Law’s Equality Project in Our Empirical Age,
in What is Parenthood? Contemporary Debates about the Family, 245–48 (Linda McClain & Daniel Cere eds.,
NYU Press, 2013) (critiquing the use of empirical studies to determine the proper place of gender in parentage
laws); Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: The Use and Misuse of Research, 13
Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 1, 10–14 (2014) (arguing that inaccurate statistical reports in a national study of
child maltreatment finding similar rates of maltreatment across races fed claims of bias in the child welfare system
and supported family preservation efforts); Libby Adler, Just the Facts: The Perils of Expert Testimony and Findings
of Fact in Gay Rights Litigation, 7 Unbound: Harv. J. Legal Left 1 (2011) (noting the multiple downsides of the
empirical battle over marriage equality, including that the facts found are not stably pro-gay and instead can be used
by anti-gay advocates); Joan S. Meier, Dangerous Liaisons: Social Science and Law in Domestic Violence Cases 6–51
(February 2, 2017), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004176 (describing and critiquing the use of social
science research purporting to establish a typology of intimate partner violence).
10 There are two notable exceptions. Margaret Brinig, one of the leading advocates and producers of empirical work
in family law, has identified several reasons why research on families may not be reliable and may not translate well
into legal rules and policies. See Margaret F. Brinig, Empirical Work in Family Law, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1083, 1084–94
(2002) (describing challenges in conducting reliable empirical work on family law—such as population heterogeneity;
the confidentiality or unavailability of data; bias by principal investigators; and the absence of control groups—and
arguing that scholars and legislatures should not respond too quickly to any single study and should not overstate the
likelihood that a law will change behavior). Brinig thus addresses questions about data reliability and the translation
of empirical evidence by legal actors, both touched upon in Part II.B. 1 & 2. Brinig does not, however, address the
other concerns of this essay: the tendency of empirical evidence to privilege outcomes, obscure the importance of a
range of values, and normalize discrimination. See infra Part II.B.2. Additionally, Peggy Cooper Davis has explored
one important aspect of an empirically based family law: the process by which judges absorb social science evidence in
family law cases as they relate to legislative facts. See Peggy C. Davis, “There Is A Book Out …”: An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1539, 1542 (1987) (noting that the article was “undertaken to
identify the ways in which judges find and use legislative facts; to discover whether there are patterns of misuse; and to
document the effect of legislative facts upon the development of law”). Cooper Davis does not, however, engage more
broadly with the use of empirical evidence across the institutions of family law and many of the questions explored in
this essay. Perhaps most importantly, Cooper Davis does not explore the central concern of this Essay: that empirical
evidence focuses attention on the outcomes of legal rules and discourages a debate about contested and competing
values. See Part II.B.2 and III.A.
11 See infra Part I.A.

C LAR E H U N T IN GTO N

|

37

from the empirical evidence.12 It is not surprising, then, that legal scholars such as
Kenji Yoshino would say “[l]et there be a trial” to resolve significant social contests.13
But not so fast. Despite its considerable benefits, the empirical turn in family law
also presents substantial concerns. As a threshold matter, there are well-rehearsed
issues with the quality of the research and the capacity of legal actors to use empirical
evidence in a nuanced manner. These concerns take on a particular hue in the context of family law, where research about families addresses complex questions such as
the relationship between family structure and child outcomes.14 Moreover, even the
most sophisticated research can leave out variables that are difficult to quantify and
yet are central to family life—love and a sense of belonging, distrust and a sense of
dislocation. In these ways, empirical evidence tells us something, but not everything,
about family life.
More fundamentally, there is a concern about using empirical evidence to resolve
some legal questions. Empirics exert a gravitational influence on decisionmaking in
a number of deeply troubling ways. To begin, the empirical turn focuses attention
on the outcomes of legal rules. Many of these outcomes, notably child well-being
and the reduction of family violence, embody important values, and family law is
rightly focused on these concerns. But the plentiful and persuasive research showing
which legal rules further these values can overshadow a consideration of other values
also at play in family law, including equality, autonomy, pluralism, and inclusion,
to mention but a few.15 Additionally, empirical evidence does not tell decisionmakers how to weight these competing values. This unequal evidentiary field can lead
12 Indeed, with a new presidential administration skeptical about well-settled science, evidence may be more
important than ever. Perhaps the best example of President Trump’s willingness to ignore overwhelming scientific
evidence is climate change, see Juliet Eilperin, Trump says “nobody really knows” if climate change is real, Wash.
Post (Dec. 11, 2016) (reporting then President-elect Trump as saying about climate change: “I’m still open-minded.
Nobody really knows.”); Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Scientific consensus: Earth’s climate is warming, http://
climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ (“97 percent or more of actively publishing climate scientists agree: Climatewarming trends over the past century are extremely likely due to human activities.”), but his skepticism about the wellsettled evidence on childhood vaccines is a good example within family law, see Michael D. Shear et al., Anti-Vaccine
Activist Says Trump Plans a Safety Panel, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 2017, at A11 (describing how then President-Elect
Trump had met with Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., a vaccine skeptic, and asked him to lead a commission on vaccine safety).
For a discussion of empirical evidence and the legal debate about mandatory vaccines, see infra text accompanying
notes 239–246.
13 See Yoshino, supra note 1, at 280; accord Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman
Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 Yale L.J. F. at 11–15 (forthcoming
2017) (arguing that a rigorous application of the undue burden test drawing on empirical evidence is a promising new
front in the fight to protect reproductive rights).
14 See infra Parts II.B.1 & 2.
15 See infra Part II.B.3. Simply naming the values at play in family law is a fraught endeavor, both because they are so
numerous and because they often conflict. By mentioning a few in the text, and omitting others clearly at play, such as
the privatization of dependency, the goal is not to elevate some values over others but rather to underscore that family
law is heavily and inevitably value-laden. For a discussion of the changing values in family law, see Naomi Cahn, The
Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 225, 227–29 236–49 (1997) (reviewing Nancy Dowd, In Defense
of Single-Parent Families & Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture) (arguing that with the challenge to
traditional morality as a justification for family law, there is a competing vision for family law—the “new family
morality”—that embraces values including gender equality, caregiving, and commitment).
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decisionmakers to focus on measurable outcomes that reflect only some values,
glossing over other values and ignoring the tension among competing values. Indeed,
it was fortuitous for advocates of marriage equality that the evidence on children’s
outcomes aligned with the values of equality and inclusion. If the empirical evidence
had shown that children of same-sex couples somehow had worse outcomes, such as
lower high school graduation rates, it would have been considerably harder to argue
for marriage equality.16
Compounding the problem, decisionmaking based on empirical evidence appears
neutral, allowing legal actors to sidestep difficult and contentious debates, such
as which families deserve legal recognition and support or which families should
receive coercive intervention because of concerns about child abuse and neglect.17
In the child welfare system, the adoption of predictive analytics to triage suspected
cases of child abuse and neglect allows agency officials to throw up their hands and
claim they are simply following the algorithm, thus avoiding questions about whether the system improperly intervenes in the lives of low-income families of color.18
Finally, relying on empirical evidence poses particular dangers to non-dominant
families. Using empirical evidence risks describing present conditions without interrogating the role of historical discrimination that continues to disadvantage some
families.19 Advocates challenging the policy of keeping Native American children
in their homes, for example, contend that this policy harms child well-being.20 But
evidence on child outcomes obscures the role of historical discrimination—indeed,
genocide—against Native American families. Government policies are a direct cause
of instability in Native American families, and uncritically adopting the evidence on
outcomes replicates discrimination against this marginalized population.
To understand these concerns with empirical evidence, consider debates over
custody and visitation rights for unmarried fathers.21 Unlike divorced and married
fathers, there is not compelling evidence that maintaining a relationship between
unmarried fathers and their children improves child outcomes.22 As courts and
legislatures decide the rules for unmarried fathers, this evidence on child outcomes
16 As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 73–112; this partly reflects the institutional context of
judicial review. If the state had evidence of worse childhood outcomes, then there might have been a legitimate state
reason for restricting marriage to different-sex couples, and a court might have upheld the restriction, depending
on the level of scrutiny. But this tendency to focus on outcomes rather than values—a tendency encouraged and
exacerbated by the availability of empirical evidence—can also happen at the legislative level, with lawmakers choosing
to focus on child outcomes rather than value-based reasons for extending or restricting the institution of marriage. See
infra Part II.B.3 & III.A.2.
17 See infra Part II.B.4.
18 See infra Part III.B.2.
19 See infra Part II.B.5.
20 For a discussion of this example, see text accompanying notes 316–19.
21 See text accompanying notes 320–23.
22 See text accompanying notes, 321.
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is likely to be influential. But focusing on child well-being distracts attention from
the other value-based reasons for protecting father-child relationships, including
gender equality and fathers’ liberty interest in the relationship. Foregrounding child
outcomes provides a seemingly neutral rationale for the choice not to protect the
parental rights of a socially marginalized group. And taking the empirical evidence
at face value ignores government policies, such as mass incarceration,23 that make it
harder for some unmarried fathers, particularly fathers of color, to play a beneficial
social and economic role in their children’s lives. In short, there are reasons to be
highly cautious about the use of empirical evidence in some contexts.
To be clear, this Essay does not condemn empirical evidence writ large. As noted
throughout, empirical evidence does and should play a vital role in answering many
family law questions and guiding family policies. But it is essential to have a clear
understanding what the empirical turn means for family law and to be ready to bend
this arc toward its most promising trajectory.
How, then, to balance the benefits of evidence-based decisionmaking against the
significant risks that the empirical turn in family law poses? This Essay proposes a
framework for calibrating this balance. Not all questions are amenable to resolution
through empirics, and decisionmakers must know when and why to use this evidence. Decisionmakers should generally rely on empirical evidence when seeking to
achieve a particular, agreed-upon outcome, such as reducing family violence, where
the valence of the choice is relatively uncontested, and where there is relative agreement about how to balance competing values. In this context, empirical evidence can
guide choices among rules and policies, highlighting relatively more effective and
efficient means for reducing violence. But contested and competing values inhere in
family law, and it is critical to preserve space for debating these values. Making these
debates explicit, rather than reflexively turning to empirical evidence, will help guard
against the tendency to use empirical evidence to avoid a debate about contested
values and norms and the tendency to prioritize only those values that are more
amenable to measurement or more compelling because of evidence.
Even when empirical evidence is relevant, decisionmakers must be cautious about
how they use it. To guide this nuance, the framework calls for more effective gatekeeping mechanisms across the institutions of family law. It warns decisionmakers
to be attentive to the potential for empirical evidence to reflect and refract the
legal salience of intersecting identities, including race, gender, and class. And it

23 See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 4 (2010)
(describing how the criminal justice system operates “as a stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of
racialized social control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow”); see generally Donald Braman,
Doing Time on the Outside: Incarceration and Family Life in Urban America, 37–96, 177–87 (2007) (describing the
impact of incarceration on a prisoner’s family).

40

|

FORDHAM L AW

encourages a more robust role for legal scholars to make empirical evidence accessible and comprehensible for those crafting legal rules and policies.
This Essay focuses on the empirical turn in family law, but empirical evidence is now an
entrenched feature of the legal system.24 By exploring the benefits and dangers of the
empirical turn in one context, this Essay contributes to a broader debate about the use
of empirical evidence trans-substantively in the law.25 Although some of the concerns
identified in this Essay are family-law specific, such as the general disregard for the
Daubert test in family court,26 most of the issues are trans-substantive, and this Essay
thus holds lessons for other areas of the law.27
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes the increasingly widespread use of
empirical evidence across many family law contexts. Part II unpacks the substantial
benefits of, and significant concerns raised by, this empirical turn. Part III draws on
this descriptive and analytical foundation to chart a path forward for the calibrated
use of empirical evidence in family law.

24 See infra text accompanying notes 40–45.
25 Jeffrey Rachlinski, for example, has argued that empirics may make sense in domains where singularly focused
outcomes can be reasonable organizing principles—as in medicine, with the goal of treating patients effectively, or
business, with the goal of profit maximization. In law, however, the endeavor is more fraught because law is inherently
political, with often contested and competing goals. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 Cornell L. Rev.
901, 917–19 (2011).
26 For an example, see text accompanying notes 168–71 (describing the failure of most family court judges to use
the Daubert test to screen out unreliable expert testimony).
27 Thus, this Essay resists family law exceptionalism, see Janet E. Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I,
23 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 4–6 (2011) (describing and challenging family law exceptionalism), and instead uses family
law as an example of the benefits but also potential dangers of the broader empirical turn.
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Ethan J. Leib
The John D. Calamari Distinguished Professor of Law

Everything will forever repeat, leading always to the same life, according
to the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s famous Zarathustra. Professor
Ethan J. Leib argues in a dynamic upcoming book review that when this
so-called doctrine of eternal recurrence is applied to deference, it results
in a complacency that is at odds with the anxiety and ambivalence we
should feel about the administrative state.
The author and editor of four books, Leib became a full-time faculty
member at Fordham Law in 2011. He subsequently received the Dean’s
Distinguished Research Award for the 2015–2016 academic year. Before
joining Fordham, Leib taught full time at UC Hastings College of the
Law in San Francisco, clerked for then Chief Judge John M. Walker Jr.
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and worked at
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP in New York. He earned his B.A. and Ph.D.
from Yale University, his J.D. from Yale Law School, and his M.Phil. from
Cambridge University.
In his forthcoming book review “Also, No,” Leib suggests that
administrative law is not just a set of doctrines and practices that lead
inexorably to deference to the administrative state; it is also a set of
anxieties and ambivalences about the bureaucratic control in liberal
democracies. Those anxieties and ambivalences are the law that
eternally recurs along with deference. That law more authentically fits
and justifies our administrative law.
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EXC E R P T

Also, No
A review of Adrian Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to the
Administrative State (Harvard Univ. Press 2016). Pp. 254. Hardback. $39.95.
[T]he dwarf murmured contemptuously[:] time itself is a circle.
“You spirit of gravity,” [Zarathustra] said angrily, “do not make things too easy for
yourself !”
– Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part III (“On the Vision and the Riddle”)1

In Zarathustra’s first recounting of the so-called doctrine of eternal recurrence, it
is his dwarf companion who first gives expression to the idea that everything will
forever repeat, leading always to the same life. The dwarf, however, fails to appreciate
just what an “abysmal thought” this doctrine is2—and seems not to understand the
psychological and normative commitments adherence to the doctrine would require.
When the animals with which Zarathustra surrounds himself later in the book
joyfully recount the eternal recurrence to him—“eternally the same house [] is built”3
—Zarathustra is disgusted by their complacency: “O you buffoons and barrel organs!
. . . [H]ave you already made a hurdy-gurdy song of this?”4 Although Zarathustra
eventually embraces the doctrine by the end of Thus Spoke Zarathustra,5 accepting the
eternal return cannot be accomplished without great suffering, effort, and anxiety.
Zarathustra, in fact, knows that teaching the doctrine is his “greatest danger and
sickness.”6 To be sure, many commentators doubt whether Zarathustra’s embrace
of the doctrine is meant to be taken at face value as a cosmological theory. Rather,
it seems not to be a serious descriptive account of the way the world is, but a way to
come to terms with our fate and live authentically.7
Adrian Vermeule embraces a doctrine of eternal recurrence of deference to the
administrative state in Law’s Abnegation. But one can reasonably worry that
Vermeule’s version is too similar to the simplistic and complacent version expounded
1 The Portable Nietzsche 270 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1982). To honor Nietzsche and Zarathustra,
I will not muck with Kaufmann’s canonical translation notwithstanding its potential offensiveness to modern ears;
for what it is worth, the Thomas Common translation also renders Zarathustra’s companion here as a “dwarf.” See
http://nietzsche.holtof.com/Nietzsche_thus_spake_zarathustra/III_46.html.
2 Id. at 328 (Part III, “The Convalescent”).
3 Id. at 329.
4 Id. at 330.
5 Id. at 340–43 (Part III, “The Seven Seals (or: The Yes and Amen Song)”).
6 The Portable Nietzsche, supra note 1, at 332 (Part III, “The Convalescent”). For more on Zarathustra’s darker
rendition of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence distinguishing it from the version embraced by the dwarf and the
animals, see, e.g., Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume II, The Eternal Recurrence of the Same (1984).
7 See generally Lawrence Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence (2005);
Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (1985).
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by Zarathustra’s dwarf and his animals. This Review suggests that administrative
law is not just a set of doctrines and practices that lead inexorably to deference to
the administrative state but that it is also a set of anxieties and ambivalences about
bureaucratic control in liberal democracies. Those anxieties and ambivalences are the
law that eternally recurs along with deference; that law more authentically fits and
justifies our administrative law.
***
The core principle Vermeule finds everywhere he looks is the eternal recurrence of
deference by courts to administrative agency decisions. From one perspective, this is
wholly uncontroversial. If a law professor were asked to teach administrative law on
one leg to new students, she would surely emphasize high agency win rates against all
manner of challenges: whether a litigant is challenging the type or scope of delegation
the legislature gave the agency; the agency’s policy choice within its delegation; the
form the agency chose to promulgate its policy (rulemaking or adjudication); the
agency’s understanding of the statutes it enforces; the agency’s understanding of its
own regulations; or the agency’s assessment of its own jurisdiction under its organic
statute, lawyers probably ought to tell their clients that the agency has a big advantage
because courts tend to defer to agencies. Indeed, the administrative law course walks
through each of these kinds of challenges to administrative decision-making—often
using a few cases that buck the trend—to train lawyers both to know that deference is
likely and to learn the outer limits of deference.
Vermeule’s argumentative move is to take this relatively uncontroversial description
of the set of rules courts have developed and suggest that they are necessarily
recurrent, almost essential, effectively denying that they are path-dependent or part
of a pendulum or a cycle. Hence, a doctrine of eternal recurrence. Not only does the
internal logic of administrative law properly marginalize the non-delegation doctrine,
but even if law’s empire returned us back to the proverbial three branches from the
founding, as his interlocutors Gary Lawson and Philip Hamburger seem to prefer,8
we would find ourselves eventually back where we are: with a vital and complex
administrative state that gets a lot of lawmaking authority with tons of deference to its
decisions. Administrative law will always lead back to its own going-under,9 abnegating
its oversight through high levels of deference. This is his account of administrative law
“working itself pure:”10 that “the arc of law bends toward deference.”11
8 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231 (1994); Philip
Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014). Vermeule’s reaction to Hamburger is at Vermeule, supra note *,
at 1547.
9 Vermeule doesn’t like the language of “overcoming,” Adrian Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to
the Administrative State 209 (2016), so I use a more Nietzschean term here.
10 This formulation appears multiple times in the book. See, e.g., id. at 22, 24.
11 Id. at 12. This formulation also appears several times in the book. Several reviewers have noticed that there is
substantial repetition in the book. No one has made a joke yet, however, about the repetitions’ relationship to the core
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So is this the dwarf ’s doctrine of eternal recurrence, or is it Zarathustra’s? Certainly,
it is hard to know what exactly would constitute proof that deference is the resting
state rather than simply a part of an ongoing cycle. But Neil Gorsuch just found
his way onto the Supreme Court. He is perhaps most notable for his views about
judicial review of the administrative state; he seems committed to using his perch to
push back on doctrines of deference, helping to revive the moribund non-delegation
doctrine.12 There is also reason to think Justices Alito and Thomas are persuadable,
whether for pragmatic or originalist motivations, that doctrines of deference have
gone too far.13 And with the obvious likelihood that the administrative state will be
taking positions on policy and statutory interpretation over the next four years that
will deeply offend the liberal wing of the Supreme Court, it is hard to believe that
circumstances aren’t ripe for the largest retrenchment on doctrines of deference that
we’ve seen in most of our lifetimes.14 It will surprise no one that deference bends to
politics;15 although that is external rather than internal to legal reasoning, it may
have a real effect on the internal shape of law to come. Perhaps history will vindicate
Vermeule here and we will still see deference prevail as the last word always, time and
again. But I think we have substantial reason to think it hasn’t quite yet been written.
***
The training that we offer administrative lawyers of the future seems to require tuning
our students in to the law’s essential ambivalence about the administrative state.
When we ask the question what is the law of the courts when it comes to reviewing
agencies, we can recite black-letter law and follow it up with some statistics about
thesis of eternal recurrence therein.
12 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).
13 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J. , concurring); Michigan v. EPA,
135 S.Ct. 2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2529 (2015) (Thomas, J. dissenting); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.Ct.
1932, 1961 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Vermeule acknowledges this wing of the current court, see Vermeule,
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 224 n. 21, but remains confident that “there is no indication whatsoever
that the Court as a body has any interest in overruling Chevron. The center holds.” Id. at 31.
14 I tend to agree with Vermeule, id. at 31, that it is a mistake to make too much of Roberts’ use of the “major
questions” doctrine in King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015), as an end-run around deference doctrines.
Only a few very salient and politically important cases are likely to get this treatment—and the idea that the IRS’s
interpretation of one word was going to control the fate of the whole statutory scheme of Obamacare was reason
enough for the Court to reassert its imperial posture. Thus, although Alito and Thomas seem likely to follow Gorsuch
in undoing deference doctrines, I’m less sure about Roberts. His reservations (with Alito and Kennedy) about
deferring to an agency’s own interpretation of its “jurisdiction” in City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 328 (2013).
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) seem to come shy of a substantial effort to unwind the core posture of deference. But add
that to his “major questions” decision in King and his concurrence in Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98 (2009), in
which he writes to emphasize the Court’s right to control cases within its original jurisdiction even when Congress
purports to limit or regulate judicial power, and maybe there are real hints that Roberts could grow closer to Gorsuch’s
anti-deference preference.
15 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment
of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1154 (2008) (Table 20); Thomas
Miles & Cass Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?: An Empirical Investigation, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823
(2006).
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what really happens when courts apply that doctrine. That is what Vermeule takes
himself to be doing in this internal point of view project. But it seems that it is much
better training and much better internal theorizing to find a way to appreciate the
deep anxieties and rifts around which the doctrine and cases actually dance.
When we ask what is the law of the administrative state, it would be just as positivist
and internal to say that we denizens of a modern democracy have substantial anxiety
about the legitimacy of the administrative state. Although we know it is silly to
enforce a non-delegation doctrine very aggressively, it is part of our constitutional
and democratic DNA, as it were, to worry about too extensive delegation to the
unelected part of our government that really doesn’t get an article of its own in our
Constitution like the other branches. Although we know it is crazy to ask judges to
understand all the complex technical and scientific data with which agencies need to
struggle on a day-to-day basis, we also know it is crazy to rubber-stamp everything
they do. We respect their expertise, but we worry about capture. We respect that there
is some accountability through the executive, but we also know about accountability
occlusion and that it is hard for voters to trace where these policy decisions get made
when they come from the bureaucracy. We like centralization of the bureaucracy in
an electorally accountable actor, but we are concerned that too unitary an executive
branch derogates from the very expertise that gives it much of its credibility because
partisan political reasons are bad reasons, generally speaking, for assuring the pursuit
of the best interests of the people. We expect legislatures will sometimes delegate hard
questions, but we can’t without very clear instructions believe that core social and
political questions that take center stage in our politics can be shoved into the mouseholes of the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. We know courts will
perform poorly if they engage in serious substantive review, but we also know that
thin procedural review can sometimes be too anemic to catch what goes wrong inside
the bureaucracy. In short, any effort to teach the law from its own internal point
of view needs to highlight the serious anxieties and ambivalences that produce the
case law in administrative law. Explaining the variance is ultimately a more pressing
project—and more illuminating about the “considerations internal to law”16—than
explaining that there is deference all around us.17
If this is right as an account of law’s relationship to the administrative state, it is
essentially wrong or misleading to conclude only that “the arc of the administrative
state bends toward deference.”18 A way to see this is to rethink [some] of the
interpretations that Vermeule offers in the book: . . . his reading of Auer19 deference
16 Id. at 209.
17 This is to say nothing about what the “administrative state” looks like at the state and local level, where deference
doctrines do not simply track the federal scheme—and the non-delegation doctrine tends to have more vitality. See
generally Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 Yale L.J. 564 (2017).
18 Vermeule supra note 9, at 216.
19 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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look[s] very different if my account of the internal perspective on administrative
law is a better description of real administrative law than his overly simplistic and
complacent account of eternal recurrence.
Auer deference doctrine is as straightforward as it is controversial. It holds that
courts will defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rules when they
are ambiguous. In some ways, it looks like a fractal of Chevron doctrine, and the
justifications aren’t dissimilar either.20 But it is black-letter law—and empirically true
at the Supreme Court—that Auer deference is a form of super-deference stronger
than Chevron.21
Vermeule’s defense of Auer in the book is very clever. Since he thinks deference
as a general posture is basically unavoidable for the judiciary, it follows that any
rearguard effort to come shy of deferring to agencies’ interpretations of their own
regulations would be incoherent and futile. There is nothing especially inappropriate
from a “separation-of-powers-without-idolatry”22 perspective with having an agency
promulgate a legislative rule with notice-and-comment rulemaking and following
up with interpretive rules that do not require notice-and-comment procedures to
clarify any ambiguities in the legislative rule; both rules would deserve deference
for much the same reasons. All of those rules are part and parcel of “carrying out or
completing a legislative plan—‘carrying [it] into execution,’ to adapt the words of
the Constitution.”23 It is not that a purposefully ambiguous legislative rule “in effect
enables agencies to ‘delegate’ power to themselves,”24 but that it is a timing decision
on the part of the agency about when to fill out the details of a regulatory scheme:
ambiguities are just as likely to permit a future administration to make the policy
as they are opportunities for the administration making the legislative rule.25 In
summary, for Vermeule, “the overall quantum of statutory power is not expanded but
instead allocated between present and future.”26
From one perspective, the recent changeover in administrations that occurred after
the publication date of Vermeule’s book makes his point nicely: whatever unilateral
agency action the Obama administration took outside of notice-and-comment
rulemaking in clarifying its agencies’ own regulations were very easily reversible by
the new Trump administration. We shouldn’t worry so much about Auer deference
precisely because the interpretative rules that are mere clarifications of underlying
legislative rules can so easily be changed. And what may have looked like power grabs
20 Vermeule supra note 9, at 75.
21 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 515 (2011).
22 Vermeule supra note 9, at 56–86.
23 Id. at 78.
24 Id. at 79.
25 Id. at 80.
26 Id.
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by agencies under President Obama now reveal themselves just to be opportunities
for President Trump.
Yet Vermeule’s perspective here is not just internal to administrative law but to his
own commitment to the sort of eternal recurrence of deference he is arguing for
throughout the book. From a more nuanced perspective of just what counts as law,
what recur (and what should recur) are anxiety and ambivalence about too much
deference. At least part of the justification for deference comes from a judicial sense
that the right kinds of procedures are what is producing policy. Central to the
legitimation of the administrative state is not just the delegation agencies receive, but
also their presumptive expertise, their flexibility and capacity for dynamic responses
to changes in society, and their democratic credibility (as compared with judges).
Administrative process matters—and has always mattered as a way to contain and
mediate a deep anxiety not just about arrogation of power by agencies to themselves
but by a worry that agencies may be using the wrong kinds of reasons when they make
their decisions.
Thus, judicial efforts to encourage agencies to use notice-and-comment rulemaking is
not just rote enforcement of the Administrative Procedure Act.27 Process helps judges
feel more confident that agencies are orienting their deliberations to the kinds of
considerations that are relevant under the statute and not acting out of inappropriate
motivations.28 This is why Auer does and should inspire anxiety: it seems to offer
especial deference in a range of contexts where there is substantially less administrative
process than in a conventional case requiring Chevron deference. Thus, Vermeule
both fails to explain the current doctrine’s commitment to super-deference (he simply
refuses to accept the black-letter law that Auer is considered to be a stronger deference
doctrine than Chevron itself )29 and discounts what is a much more anxious and
unstable comportment of the judiciary to this doctrine. The higher law here “worked
pure”—seeing itself as a tangle of anxiety and ambivalence about the right amount of
administrative process—may well produce the undoing of Auer soon enough.30
27 5 U.S.C. § 553.
28 On the demand that agencies act for the right kinds of reasons, see Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary
Political Theory: A Critique, 125 Yale L.J. 1820, 1861–65 (2016). That article makes a more sustained effort to defend
Vermeule’s approach but ultimately finds Michigan v. EPA , 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015), and Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
476 (2011) hard to reconcile with Vermeule’s denigration of the requirement that agencies be conscientious about the
reasons they use to make their policies.
29 Vermeule supra note 9, at 79–80 (calling the doctrinal differences in deference levels to be “dubious” and
“metaphysical”).
30 Indeed, pace Vermeule, id. at 83–84, this means we will be left with Skidmore-based “deference” for agency
interpretations of their own regulations. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Yes, Skidmore “deference”
is a bit of a misnomer. But there is plenty reason to be very concerned that agencies will end up using ad hoc and
motivated reasoning in such interpretive contexts—making decisions for the wrong kinds of reasons—and that courts
should be engaging in more scrutiny here.
Jeff Pojanowski is working on an illuminating history of Auer, revealing that its roots in Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), probably show that Skidmore was the right frame for agency interpretations of their
own regulations all along. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Seminole Rock Revisited (forthcoming 2017).
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Justice Scalia was probably right that Auer doctrine creates poor incentives for
agencies.31 Notwithstanding Vermeule’s insightful point about the attendant risks
for agencies that promulgate ambiguous legislative regulations with the hope of
getting super-deference later for their interpretive regulations, it remains true that
Auer creates incentives for agencies not to subject their regulations to the full hearing
and input notice-and-comment rulemaking would provide them. Not only might
that conduce to less thought-through decisions, but there is less check on agencies
deciding for the right kinds of reasons, less of a way for courts to sniff foul play. That
those decisions are easy to reverse in subsequent administrations (or after more policy
learning from experience) is cold comfort: long-standing interpretive regulations have
their own inertia—and poorly considered policies with a four- or eight-year shelf life
can still do plenty of harm, not to mention the entitlement effects they can create
by resetting baselines. In short, the “timing” story Vermeule offers to defend Auer
doesn’t fully mitigate the kinds of worries plenty of people are right to have about the
doctrine; the real law of the administrative state—anxiety and ambivalence about too
much deference with too little process to smoke out whether an agency is using the
right kinds of reasons—probably creates an arc against Auer deference.32
***
Ultimately, Vermeule’s eternal recurrence doctrine either looks like a self-fulfilling
prophecy or it is too simplistic and complacent to accept. A more sophisticated
doctrine that would make Zarathustra proud must be much more attuned to the
way eternal recurrence of deference is actually an abysmal thought. It is so because
we should have anxiety and ambivalence about the administrative state—and these
anxieties and ambivalences are as much the law of the administrative state as is
deference all-the-way-down.

31 Scalia’s resistance to Auer probably can be traced back to his dissent in United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218,
246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Agencies will now have high incentive to rush out barebones, ambiguous rules
construing statutory ambiguities, which they can then in turn further clarify through informal rulings entitled to
judicial respect.”), but appeared in more recent cases like Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1212–13
(2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) and Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S.Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Vermeule is successful in his effort to defend Auer against the
formalistic separation-of-powers challenge from Perez but is less successful against the more pragmatic challenge I
specify above. That pragmatic challenge was first laid out in John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996), a paper subsequently relied
upon and cited by Scalia in Mead and by Alito in Perez.
32 Indeed, the writing seems on the wall for Auer especially: Justices Scalia, see id., Roberts, see id. at 1338 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring), Alito, see id., Thomas, see Perez, 135 S.Ct. at 1213, and Ginsburg, Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504, 518 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting), have all signed opinions against it—and it is hard to see Gorsuch as
a fan in light of all of his skepticism about the administrative state more generally, see generally Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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For centuries, debtor misconduct, via aggressive dividend payments,
piled-on debt, and asset substitution, has left debtors and creditors
worse off. Professor Richard Squire, a leading scholar on corporate
reorganization in bankruptcy, proposes remedies to these age-old
problems, with a rich scholarly oeuvre that draws upon his financial and
legal background.
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2015–2016 academic year and back-to-back Teacher of the Year awards,
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Lipton, Rosen & Katz and served as a law clerk to Judge Robert D. Sack
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Most recently, Squire contributed a chapter titled “Distress-Triggered
Liabilities and the Agency Costs of Debt” to the forthcoming Elgar
Research Handbook on Corporate Bankruptcy Law. In this chapter, he expands
on his previous writings on the topic of contingent claims, a contractual
obligation triggered upon the occurrence of an uncertain future event.
He discusses three prevalent contingent-claim arrangements—the loan
default penalty, the loan prepayment fee, and the intragroup guarantee—
whose use reflects a type of debtor misconduct called correlationseeking, and he describes how the prevention of correlation-seeking can
reduce the agency costs of debt.
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EXC E R P T

Distress-Triggered Liabilities and
the Agency Costs of Debt
in Elgar Research Handbook on Corporate Bankruptcy Law (B. Adler, ed.)
(forthcoming 2018)
Introduction
Firms with debt can take actions that benefit their shareholders not by creating
value but by shifting risk onto creditors. Termed from the creditors’ perspective,
such acts of “debtor misconduct”1 range from aggressive dividend payments and
piling on more debt2 to subtler maneuvers, such as asset substitution (exchanging
safe assets for risky ones).3 Contract creditors can anticipate debtor misconduct and
demand higher interest rates as ex ante compensation. For this reason, misconduct
is unlikely to change the division of wealth between debtors and most creditors.4
But misconduct does generate economic costs that erode the joint surplus from debt
arrangements, leaving debtors and creditors collectively worse off.
In an important 1976 article, Michael Jensen and William Meckling grouped the
economic costs of debtor misconduct into three categories.5 First, creditors incur
monitoring costs to deter misconduct. Second, debtors incur bonding costs to try
to seem more trustworthy, hoping that creditors will respond by demanding less
interest. Finally, undeterred misconduct induces debtors to overinvest, committing capital to projects that increase expected shareholder returns only because the
projects are subsidized by value transfers from creditors.6 Conceptualizing debtors
as agents who manage (and sometimes mismanage) capital on behalf of creditors,
Jensen and Meckling referred to these three categories of costs as the agency costs
of debt.7
1 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 Yale L.J. 131, 135–36 (1989) (defining debtor
misconduct as actions adverse to lenders that firms take after incurring debt).
2 Increasing a firm’s debt-equity ratio makes its debt riskier, which shifts value from existing creditors to
equityholders unless the creditors adjust by charging more interest. Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J.
Legal Stud. 209, 228 (1989).
3 Asset substitution shifts value from creditor to equityholders by increasing the variance in the distribution of the
firm’s potential asset values. Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories,
10 J. Legal Stud. 1, 11 (1981).
4 Debtor misconduct probably does reduce net recoveries for involuntary tort claimants, who cannot adjust the
interest rate payable on their claims. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L.J. 857, 892 (1996).
5 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
6 Jensen and Meckling did not use the term “overinvestment” but rather referred to the costs of undeterred
misconduct as the “residual loss.” Id. at 308.
7 Id.
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In prior work, I have described a form of debtor misconduct, correlation-seeking,8
that involves the use of contingent claims. A contingent claim is a contractual obligation that is triggered upon the occurrence of an uncertain (that is, non-inevitable)
future event. An example is a loan guarantee requiring the guarantor to compensate
the lender if the borrower defaults. Firms usually receive some form of compensation
for agreeing to incur contingent claims. For example, guarantors often receive premiums in the form of one or more direct payments. And, when borrowers grant lenders
contingent claims (such as default penalties) in loan agreements, the borrowers
typically receive in return an interest-rate discount on the underlying loan.9
Correlation-seeking occurs when a debtor sells a contingent claim against itself with
a positive “internal correlation”—that is, a positive correlation between the risk that
the debtor will become insolvent and the risk that the claim will be triggered. The
compensation the debtor receives for the claim benefits its shareholders by increasing the debtor’s equity value. The shareholders do not, however, bear a proportionate
share of the expected burden of the contingent claim, which is likely to be triggered
when the debtor is insolvent and thus the shareholders’ interests are already wiped
out. Rather, the expected burden falls disproportionately on the debtor’s general
creditors, the residual claimants when the debtor is insolvent. As a result, the sale of
a contingent claim with a positive internal correlation shifts value from the debtor’s
general creditors to its equityholders. These value transfers, and the efforts parties
make to prevent them, generate the agency cost of debt.10
This chapter discusses three prevalent contingent-claim arrangements whose use
reflects correlation-seeking. They are the loan default penalty, the loan prepayment
fee (one variety of which is the make-whole premium), and the intragroup guarantee. What these arrangements have in common is that they are distress-triggered
liabilities, meaning they are contingent claims that tend to be triggered by the
debtor’s own financial distress. For this reason, the arrangements have high internal
correlations inherent in their structures.
A loan default penalty is a contractual fine that a borrower must pay, on top of the
regular loan balance, for missing a scheduled loan payment. It can take the form of a
fixed fee, a higher interest rate, or both. A default penalty can serve the economically
useful function of deterring late payments, thereby reducing the lender’s need to
incur collection costs. But the penalty is also a contingent claim that inherently has a
high internal correlation, as a borrower is especially likely to miss a payment and thus
trigger the penalty when insolvent.
8 Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1151, 1157 (2010)
(defining and describing correlation-seeking).
9 Id. at 1159.
10 Id. at 1180–82.
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A loan prepayment fee, in turn, is a contractual penalty a borrower must pay for
electing to repay a loan before its maturity date. The fee can serve the positive function of protecting the lender against the risk that the borrower will refinance a loan
to take advantage of a drop in market interest rates. One variety of prepayment fee,
the make-whole premium, has been the subject of several recent bankruptcy decisions. The main question in the cases has been whether the automatic acceleration of
loans upon the debtor’s voluntary bankruptcy filing constituted, per the terms of the
loan agreement, a prepayment event triggering the premium. In loan agreements in
which the answer is yes, the make-whole premium is especially likely to be triggered
by the borrower’s own insolvency and therefore have a high internal correlation.
The third example of a distress-triggered liability is a guarantee issued by one entity
in a corporate group on the debt of another member. Intragroup guarantees can
reduce incentives for managers to play a kind of shell game with the firm’s assets,
shifting them among affiliated entities to the detriment of creditors. Because, however, the typical corporate group is in fact a single business firm, whose constituent
entities thrive or fail in unison, the guarantor entity is likely to be insolvent when a
claim on an intragroup guarantee is triggered.11
Bankruptcy courts could eliminate the value transfers produced by distress-triggered
liabilities, thereby reducing the agency costs of debt, if they subordinated claims on
such liabilities to the claims of general creditors. Subordination would eliminate
the value transfers away from general creditors that cause parties to incur monitoring and bonding costs and encourage overinvestment. But would subordination
interfere with the positive functions of distress-triggered liabilities? With respect to
loan default penalties and prepayment fees, the answer is unambiguously no. Those
contingent liabilities serve to deter late payments and opportunistic prepayments by
making them costly for the borrower (or its shareholders). But the liabilities serve no
useful deterrence function if their burden is instead borne by the borrower’s general
creditors. Therefore, a rule that subordinated such liabilities to general unsecured
debt, but left them recoverable ahead of shareholder interests, would preserve their
positive functions while eliminating the value transfers that drive up the agency costs
of debt.
The story is a bit more complicated with intragroup guarantees, which can serve a
positive function even when enforceable at the expense of general creditors. That
function is to make it harder for a corporate group to reduce one constituent entity’s
cost of credit by assigning it assets belonging to other indebted entities in the group.
At the same time, however, intragroup guarantees reduce the monitoring incentives
of the sophisticated lenders who typically receive them, and for this reason can make
the opportunistic shuttling of assets across entity boundaries more likely rather than
less. Moreover, the issuance of the guarantee itself typically shifts value from the
11 Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 605, 626–27 (2011).
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guarantor’s general creditors to the group’s shareholders, increasing the agency costs
of debt directly. The implication is that the costs of enforcing intragroup guarantees
at the expense of the guarantor’s general creditors usually outweigh the economic
benefits. If claims on intragroup guarantees were subordinated, they would continue
to be fully enforceable against solvent guarantors, the context in which the benefits
of enforcing them unambiguously outweigh the social costs.
Bankruptcy courts currently do not subordinate claims on most distress-triggered
liabilities, nor do they analyze legal challenges to such claims in terms of the agency
costs of debt. A consistently enforced subordination rule would reduce the overall
costs of debt, which is a primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code; in most cases it
would accord with the text of the Code as well.
Debtor Misconduct and the Agency Costs of Debt
The problem of debtor misconduct has been recognized for centuries. The first statute on fraudulent conveyances, enacted by the English Parliament in 1571, targeted
the most flagrant form: the eve-of-bankruptcy asset giveaway to friends, family, or
other accomplices.12 In the last several decades, commentators have described subtler
maneuvers that take value from creditors not by stripping away the debtor’s assets
but by causing the creditors to bear more risk. An example of such a risk-shifting
maneuver is correlation-seeking, which like other types of debtor misconduct distorts investment incentives, and whose prospect induces parties to incur monitoring
and bonding costs. Correlation-seeking is unusual, however, in its impact on equity
volatility, making it more attractive to shareholders than other misconduct types.
In most forms of debtor misconduct, the debtor either incurs no new debt (asset
substitution) or incurs only fixed debt (risk expansion, debt dilution, involuntary
subordination).13 Correlation-seeking, by contrast, involves the incurring of contingent debt—in particular, contingent debt that is especially likely to become payable
when the debtor is insolvent.
As an illustration of correlation-seeking, imagine that a firm borrows $90 under the
following terms: it will owe the lender $100 in one year, unless the firm becomes
insolvent before then, in which case it will owe the lender $200. This arrangement
consists of a fixed liability of $100 plus a contingent liability, triggered by the
borrower’s insolvency, of another $100. The contingent liability has a high internal correlation, as it perfectly positively correlated with the firm’s insolvency risk.
To be sure, the lender is unlikely to recover the full $200 if the borrower becomes
12 13 Eliz. I, c. 5.
13 See id. at 768 (modeling risk expansion using fixed debt); Jensen & Meckling, note 5 above, at 334–37 (modeling
asset substitution using fixed debt).
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insolvent. But as long as the claim on the contingent liability is enforceable on par
with, or ahead of, the claims of the borrower’s general creditors, it has some value
to the lender, who therefore will be willing to charge less interest on the underlying
loan. For example, without the $100 contingent claim, the borrower might insist on
being repaid $110 in one year, charging $20 in interest rather than $10. In essence,
the borrower uses the contingent claim to sell the lender a portion of the borrower’s
future bankruptcy estate that would otherwise go to its general creditors. The sales
price—in the form of an interest-rate discount—increases the borrower’s equity value, and it also might augment the borrower’s estate if bankruptcy ensues. However, it
can readily be shown mathematically that the expected cost of the contingent-claim
arrangement to the borrower’s general creditors will exceed any benefit they might
receive from the sales price collected by the borrower.14 As a consequence, the
incurring of the contingent claim produces a distortive transfer from the borrower’s
general creditors to its shareholders.
There is a general sense in which correlation-seeking, asset substitution, and risk
expansion operate by a common mechanism. Asset substitution and risk expansion both increase the variance of the distribution of the debtor’s potential asset
values. Higher asset-value variability, in turn, produces wider swings in the debtor’s
net worth.15 In this way, these forms of debtor misconduct are similar to correlation-seeking, which also increases the variance of the distribution of the debtor’s
potential net worth.16 However, correlation-seeking has this effect not by increasing
asset-value variability, but by causing increases in a firm’s debt level to coincide with
decreases in its asset value.
Given that most shareholders are risk-averse, increased net-worth variability might
seem to be a negative side effect of these various forms of debtor misconduct. But
what actually matters to corporate shareholders is not their firm’s net worth per se,
but rather the value of their equity interests—which, unlike the firm’s net worth,
cannot drop below zero. And, in terms of the equity-value variability, most correlation-seeking has the opposite effect of other types of debtor misconduct.17 Asset
substitution, risk expansion, and debt dilution all have a positive relationship with
equity volatility: the larger the distortive transfer, the greater the increase in equity volatility. For example, both asset substitution and risk expansion operate by
increasing the variability of the debtor’s asset value, which perforce increases equity
volatility. Debt dilution also increases equity volatility, as it concentrates swings in
a debtor’s asset value onto a relatively narrower equity cushion. To risk-averse

14
15
16
17
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See Squire, note 8 above, at 1163–75; Squire, note 15 above, at 664–69.
Comparably, debt dilution increases the relative standard deviation of the debtor’s potential net-worth values.
Squire, note 8 above, at 1176.
Id.
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shareholders, higher equity volatility is a cost of these forms of misconduct, weakening their appeal in terms of overall shareholder utility.18
Correlation-seeking defies the standard relationship between risk and return. As is
true with fixed debt, the incurring of most contingent debt dilutes the debtor’s equity cushion and thus increases equity volatility. However, as the contingent liability’s
internal correlation—and hence the distortive transfer—grows, the impact on equity
volatility typically shrinks.19 To see why, imagine a contingent liability with a 50%
chance of being triggered if the debtor remains solvent but no chance of being triggered if the debtor becomes insolvent. The liability has a negative internal correlation
and therefore does not transfer value from the debtor’s creditors to its equityholders. (Indeed, it shifts value in the opposite direction.20) The liability does, however,
increase the variance of the distribution of the potential values of shareholder equity.
In contrast, consider a converse contingent liability, with a 50% chance of being
triggered if the debtor becomes insolvent but no chance of being triggered if the
debtor remains solvent. This liability has a perfectly positive internal correlation and
thus transfers value from the debtor’s existing creditors to its equityholders. But it
does not make shareholder equity more volatile, as it can be triggered only when
shareholder equity has no value. The relationship between the size of the transfer
and equity volatility is thus inverted: as the transfer becomes larger, the impact on
equity volatility decreases. This unusual feature of correlation-seeking increases its
attractiveness to shareholders relative to other misconduct types.21

18 Shareholders can diversify away the increased equity volatility only to the extent that it is unsystematic. Debt
dilution increases both systematic and unsystematic risk, while asset substitution and risk expansion increase
systematic risk to the extent that the volatility of the riskier asset reflects systematic risk.
19 Squire, note 8 above, at 1176–78.
20 Squire, note 8 above, at 1167.
21 Id. at 1178.
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“Corporate Interest and the Right to Regulate in Investor-State Arbitration” in
Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers
2015 (Arthur W. Rovine, ed., Leiden: Brill, 2017).
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JOSEPH LANDAU
Professor of Law
B.A., Duke University, 1995; J.D., Yale Law School, 2002
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“New Consensus Constitutionalism,” 103 Iowa Law Review ___ (2017) (forthcoming).

THOMAS H. LE E
Leitner Family Professor of Law & Director of Graduate and International Studies
A.B., 1991; A.M., 1991; J.D., 2000; Ph.D. candidate (Political Science), Harvard
University
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Natural Born Citizen,” 67 American University Law Review ___ (2017) (forthcoming).
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“International Arbitration of Patent Claims” in Contemporary Issues in International
Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2015 (Arthur Rovine, ed., Leiden: BrillNijhoff, 2016).
“Fair Winds and Following Seas, Shipmate,” 42 Ohio Northern University Law Review
877–881 (2016).

YOU NGJAE LEE
Professor of Law
B.A., Swarthmore College, 1995; J.D. magna cum laude, Harvard University, 1999
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Criminal Jury and Moral Judgments,” ___ University of Illinois Law Review ___ (2018)
(forthcoming).
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Criminal Jury and Political Representation” in Philosophical Foundations of Criminal
Procedure (Vincent Chiao, Chad Flanders, Stephen Galoob & Francois TanguayRenaud, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) (forthcoming).

E THAN J. LEIB
John D. Calamari Distinguished Professor of Law
B.A., Yale University, 1997; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 1998; J.D., Yale Law
School, 2003; Ph.D., Yale University, 2004
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Consumer Form Contracting in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: The Unread and
the Undead,” 2017 University of Illinois Law Review 65–109 [with Zev Eigen].
“Legislative Underwrites,” 103 Virginia Law Review ___ (2017) (forthcoming) [with
James J. Brudney].
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Also, No. On Law’s Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to the Administrative State by
Adrian Vermeule.” 53 University of Tulsa Law Review ___ 2017 (forthcoming).
“Fiduciary Principles and Public Office” in The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law
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(Evan Criddle, Paul Miller & Robert Sitkoff, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2018) (forthcoming) [with Stephen R. Galoob].
“Fiduciary Political Theory and Legitimacy” in Fiduciary Government (Paul Miller, et al.,
eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) (forthcoming) [with Stephen R.
Galoob].
“On Seow Hon Tan’s ‘Justice as Friendship: A Theory of Law’,” 4 Amity: The Journal of
Friendship Studies ___ (2017) (forthcoming).

ROBIN A. LENHA R DT
Professor of Law & Faculty Director, Center on Race, Law & Justice
A.B., Brown University, 1989; M.P.A., Harvard University, JFK School of Government,
1995; J.D., Harvard University, 1995; L.L.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 2004
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Moore Kinship,” 85 Fordham Law Review 2551–2557 (2017) [with Clare Huntington].
“The Color of Kinship,” 102 Iowa Law Review 2071–2107 (2017).
“Racial Vagueness and the Affirmative Action Debate,” ___ Fordham Law Review ___
(2018) (forthcoming).

M ICHAEL M. MA RT IN
Distinguished Professor of Law
B.A. with High Distinction with honors, University of Iowa, 1963; J.D., University of
Iowa College of Law, 1966; B.Litt. (Law), Oxford University, 1968; M.Litt., Oxford
University, 1979.
B OOKS:

December 2016 Cumulative Supplement: Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 11th ed.
San Francisco, CA: LexisNexis, 2015 [with Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra].
June 2017 Cumulative Supplement: Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 11th ed. San
Francisco, CA: LexisNexis, 2015 [with Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra].
New York Evidence Handbook: Rules, Theory, and Practice, 3d ed. New York: Wolters
Kluwer Law & Business, 2017 (forthcoming) [with Daniel J. Capra].

CHI ADANNA MGBA KO
Clinical Professor of Law & Director, Leitner International Human Rights Clinic
B.A. magna cum laude, Columbia University, 2001; J.D., Harvard University, 2005
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Prostitution/Sex Work in Africa” in Oxford Research Encyclopedias: African History
(Thomas Spear, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) (forthcoming).

JACQU ELINE NO L A N-HA L E Y
Professor of Law
A.B., Emmanuel College, 1971; J.D. cum laude, Suffolk University Law School, 1975;
LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1981
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B OOKS:

Global Issues in Mediation. St. Paul, MN: West, 2018 (forthcoming) [with E. Deason
and M.H. C. Gonstead].
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Designing Systems for Achieving Justice after a Peace Agreement: The Case of Northern
Ireland,” 13 University of St. Thomas Law Journal 315–333 (2017).
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Mediators in Arbitration” in Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration (Thomas
Schultz & Federico Ortino, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) (forthcoming).
“Mediation Skills” in The Sage Encyclopedia of Political Behavior (Fathali M.
Moghaddam, ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2017).

M ARK R. PATT E R S O N
Professor of Law
B.S.E.E. summa cum laude, Ohio State University, 1978; M.S., Ohio State University,
1980; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1991
B OOKS:

Antitrust Law in the New Economy: Google, Yelp, LIBOR, and the Control of
Information. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017.
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Assessing Power in Two-Sided Information Markets” in Antitrust Between EU Law and
National Law: XII Conference (Enrico Adriano Raffaelli, ed., Brussels: Bruylant, 2017).
“Antitrust, Consumer Protection, and the New Information Platforms,” 31(3) Antitrust
97–103 (Summer 2017).

KIMANI PAU L-E MIL E
Associate Professor of Law
B.A. with honors, Brown University; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D.,
New York University
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Blackness as Disability,” 106 Georgetown Law Journal ___ (2018) (forthcoming).
“Risk, Race, and Reproduction,” 83 Fordham Law Review ___ (2018) (forthcoming).

RUSSELL G. PE A RC E
Edward & Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics, Morality & Religion
B.A., Yale University, 1978; J.D., Yale Law School, 1981
B OOKS:

Professional Responsibility: A Contemporary Perspective, 3d ed. St. Paul, MN: West,
2017 [with Renee Newman Knake, Bruce A. Green, Peter A. Joy et al.].
Teacher’s Manual, Professional Responsibility: A Contemporary Perspective, 3d ed. St.
Paul, MN: West, 2017 [with Renee Newman Knake, Bruce A. Green, Peter A. Joy et al.].
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J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to Law Practice,” 29 Georgetown Journal
of Legal Ethics 601–648 (2016) [with Eli Wald].
“A Challenge to Bleached Out Professional Identity: How Jewish was Justice Louis
Brandeis?” 33 Touro Law Review 335–370 (2017) [with Adam B. Winer & Emily
Jenab].
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Reflections on Identity, God, and Lawyers,” Cosmologics, May 20, 2017 [with
Emily Jenab].

JOHN PFAFF
Professor of Law
B.A., University of Chicago, 1997; J.D., University of Chicago School of Law, 2003;
Ph.D., University of Chicago, 2005
B OOKS:

Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration—And How to Achieve Real Reform.
New York: Basic Books, 2017.
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“The Geography of Prosecutors,” ___ Fordham Urban Law Journal ___ (2017)
(forthcoming).
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“The Need for Prosecutorial Guidelines” in Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Incarceration (Chris W. Surprenant, ed., New York: Routledge, 2017) (forthcoming).
“Imprisoned by Violence,” Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2017, at C1.
“The never-ending ‘Willie Horton effect’ is keeping prisons too full for America’s good.”
Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2017, at A19.

CAT HERINE P OWE L L
Professor of Law
B.A., Yale College; M.P.A., Princeton University (International Development
Concentration) Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; J.D., Yale
Law School, Earl Warren Scholar
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“How Women Could Save the World, If Only We Would Let Them: From Gender
Essentialism to Inclusive Security,” 28 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 271–325
(2017).
“Gender Indicators as Global Governance: This Is Not Your Father’s World Bank,”
17 Georgetown Journal of Gender & the Law 777–807 (2016).

B IB LIO GR AP H Y

|

79

JOEL R. REIDE NB E RG
Stanley D. and Nikki Waxberg Professor of Law & Director, Fordham Center on Law &
Information Policy
A.B. magna cum laude, Dartmouth College, 1983; J.D., Columbia Law School,
1986; D.E.A., Université de Paris I-Sorbonne, 1987; Ph.D. (Law), Université de Paris
I-Sorbonne, 2003
B OOKS:

Digitocracy: Law and Governance in the Digital Age. New Haven: Yale University Press,
2018 (forthcoming).
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Accountable Algorithms,” 165 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 633–706 (2017)
[with Joshua A. Kroll, et al.].
“Ambiguity in Privacy Policy and the Impact of Regulation,” 45 Journal of Legal Studies
S163-S190 (2016) [lead author with Jaspreet Bhatia, Travis D. Breaux, & Thomas B.
Norton].
“PrivOnto: a Semantic Framework for the Analysis of Privacy Policies,” ___ Semantic
Web Journal __ (2017) (forthcoming) [with Alessandro Oltramari, et al.].
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Automated Analysis of Privacy Requirements for Mobile Apps,” Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium: San Diego, 2017. Available at https://www.
internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/ndss2017_05A-5_Zimmeck_paper.pdf [with
Sebastian Zimmeck, et al.].
“Automated Analysis of Privacy Requirements for Mobile Apps,” Association for the
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Fall Symposium on Privacy and Language
Technologies: Arlington, 2016. Available at https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/FSS/
FSS16/paper/view/14113 [with Sebastian Zimmeck, et al.].
“A Theory of Vagueness and Privacy Risk Perception,” International Requirements
Engineering Conference: Beijing, 2016. Available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
document/7765508/ [with Jaspreet Bhatia, Travis D. Breaux & Thomas B. Norton].
“The Creation and Analysis of a Website Privacy Policy Corpus,” Annual Meeting of the
Association for Computational Linguistics: Berlin, 2016. Available at http://anthology.
aclweb.org/P/P16/P16–1126.pdf [with Shomir Wilson, et al.].

N . CAMERON R USS E L L
Executive Director, Center for Law and Information Policy and Adjunct Professor
of Law
B.S.B.A., UNC-Chapel Hill, Flagler Business School, 2002; J.D., University of Denver,
Sturm College of Law, 2006; LL.M. magna cum laude, Fordham University School of
Law, 2013
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“PrivOnto: a Semantic Framework for the Analysis of Privacy Policies,” ___ Semantic
Web Journal ___ (2017) (forthcoming) [with Alessandro Oltramari, et al.].
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B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“The Creation and Analysis of a Website Privacy Policy Corpus,” Annual Meeting of the
Association for Computational Linguistics: Berlin, 2016, available at http://anthology.
aclweb.org/P/P16/P16–1126.pdf [with Shomir Wilson, et al.].

A ARON SAIGER
Professor of Law
A.B., Harvard College, 1988; J.D., Columbia Law School, 2000; Ph.D., Princeton
University, 2004
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Agencies’ Obligation to Interpret the Statute,” 69 Vanderbilt Law Review 1231–1294
(2016).
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“A Conversation with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Professor Aaron Saiger,” 85
Fordham Law Review 1497–1515 (2017).
“The Unintended Consequences of School Vouchers: Rout and Rebirth” in Policy Goes
to School: Case Studies on the Limitations and Possibilities of Educational Innovation
(Gilberto Q. Conchas & Michael Gottfried, eds., New York: Routledge, 2017).

S USAN SCAFI DI
Director, Fashion Law Institute
B.A., Duke University; J.D., Yale Law School
B OOKS:

Counterfeit Chic. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019 (forthcoming).
Fashion Law: Cases and Materials. St. Paul, MN: West Academic Publishing, 2018
(forthcoming).
Fashion Law in a Nutshell. St. Paul, MN: West Academic Publishing, 2018 [with
Fashion Law Institute faculty] (forthcoming).
Intellectual Property Law. St. Paul, MN: West Academic Publishing, 2018 [with Hugh
Hansen & Daryl Lim] (forthcoming).
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“O Aspecto Ético da Moda” in Moda, Luxo e Direito! (Susy Inés Bello Knoll, et al., eds.,
Buenos Aires: Albremática, 2017) [with Jeff Trexler].
“Re-Fashioning the Law,” New York Law Journal, September 12, 2016, at S14.

BETH SCHWARTZ
Clinical Professor of Law & Director of Professional Skills
B.A., SUNY Buffalo, 1974; J.D., St. John’s University School of Law, 1978
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

Clinical Legal Education Association Handbook for New Clinical Teachers, 8th ed.,
2017 [with Cynthia Batt, D’Lorah Hughes & Kele Stewart].
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JED HANDELS MA N S HUGE R MA N
Professor of Law
B.A., Yale University, 1996; J.D., Yale Law School, 2002; Ph.D., Yale University, 2008
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Modern American Tort Law” in The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Life and Law of the Commonwealth, 1684–2017
( John Hare, ed., University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2017)
(forthcoming).

RICHARD SQUIR E
Alpin J. Cameron Chair in Law
B.A. summa cum laude, Bowdoin College, 1993; M.B.A., Harvard University, 2001;
J.D. magna cum laude, Harvard Law School, 2001
B OOKS:

Corporate Bankruptcy and Financial Reorganization. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2016.
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance,” 117 Columbia
Law Review 767–829 (2017) [with Zohar Goshen].

L INDA SU GIN
Associate Dean of Academic Affairs & Professor of Law
B.A., Harvard University, 1984; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1988
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Invisible Taxpayers,” 69 Tax Law Review 617–675 (2016).
“Competitive Philanthropy: Charitable Naming Rights, Inequality, and Social Norms,”
___ Ohio State Law Journal ___ (2018) (forthcoming).

JOSEPH C. SW E E NE Y
John D. Calamari Distinguished Professor of Law, Emeritus
A.B., Harvard, 1954; J.D., Boston University, 1957; LL.M., Columbia, 1963
B OOKS:

The Life and Times of Arthur Browne in Ireland and America, 1756–1805: Civil Law
and Civil Liberties. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2017.
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Professor Emeritus Robert M. Byrn (1931–2017): A Remembrance,” 85 Fordham Law
Review 2549–2550 (2017).

O LIVIER SY LVA IN
Associate Professor of Law
B.A., Williams College, 1995; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1999;
M.Phil., Columbia University, 2005; Ph.D., Columbia University, 2010
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J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Intermediary Design Duties,” 50 Connecticut Law Review ___ (2018) (forthcoming).

Z EPHYR T EACHO UT
Associate Professor of Law
B.A., Yale University, 1993; M.A., Duke University, 1999; J.D., Duke Law School, 1999
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Soul of Corruption,” ___ Daedalus ___ (2017) (forthcoming).
“What is An Emolument?” ___ South Texas Law Review ___ (2018) (forthcoming).
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Two Kinds of Constitutions.” Review of The Crisis of the Middle Class Constitution by
Ganesh Sitaraman. ___ American Prospect ___ (2017) (forthcoming).

STEVE T HEL
I. Maurice Wormser Professor of Law
B.A., North Texas State University, 1976; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1979
B OOKS:

2017 Cumulative Supplement, Investment Management Law & Regulation, 3d ed.
New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2015 [with Harvey Bines].
2017 Cumulative Supplement, Contract Enforcement: Specific Performance and
Injunctions, 2d ed. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2011 [with Edward Yorio].
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Symposium: The Changing Face of Corporate Compliance and Corporate Governance:
Editor’s Foreword,” 21 Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 1–4 (2016).

DAVID U DELL
Director, National Center for Access to Justice
B.A. cum laude, Brandeis University, 1972; J.D., New York University School of Law,
1982
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Law Schools Must Focus on Access to Justice,” New York Law Journal, September 27,
2016, at 6 [with Jonathan Lippman & Matthew Diller].
“The Civil Legal Aid Movement: 15 Initiatives that are Increasing Access to Justice in the
United States,” 2 Impact: Collected Essays on Expanding Access to Justice 73–80 (2016).

I AN WEINST E IN
Professor of Law
B.A., Reed College, 1981; J.D. cum laude, New York University School of Law, Order of
the Coif, 1986; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1990
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“Coordinating Access to Justice for Low and Moderate Income People,” ___ NYU
Journal of Legislation & Public Policy___ (2017) (forthcoming).
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BENJAMIN ZIP UR S KY
Professor of Law & James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics
B.A., Swarthmore College, 1982; M.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1985; Ph.D.,
University of Pittsburgh, 1987; J.D. magna cum laude, New York University School of
Law, 1991
J O U RN AL A RTIC LES:

“The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability,” 85 Fordham Law Review
743–788 (2016) [with John C.P. Goldberg].
“The Myths of MacPherson,” 9 Journal of Tort Law 91–123 (2016) [with John C.P.
Goldberg].
“Online Defamation, Legal Concepts, and the Good Samaritan,” 51 Valparaiso Law
Review 1–56 (2017).
B OOK C HAPTE RS & OTHER W R ITINGS:

“Thinking in the Box in Legal Scholarship: The Good Samaritan and Internet Libel,”
66 Journal of Legal Education 55–63 (2016).
“Triangular Torts and Fiduciary Duties” in Contract, Status and Fiduciary Law (Paul B.
Miller & Andrew S. Gold, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) [with John C.P.
Goldberg].
Review of Normative Subjects: Self and Collectivity in Morality and Law by Meir DanCohen, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 31, 2017).
“The Cathedral Through the Looking Glass: A Commentary on Dagan and Dorfman’s
‘Just Relationships’,” 117 Columbia Law Review Online 165–178 (2017).
“Hohfeldian Analysis and the Separation of Rights and Powers” in The Legacy of Wesley
Hohfeld: Edited Major Works, Select Personal Papers, and Original Commentaries (Shyam
Balganesh, Ted Sichelman & Henry Smith, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2018) (forthcoming) [with John C.P. Goldberg].
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